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Abstract
By the measure of its mission, the Indian Health Service is one of the most successful and productive
government agencies. At the same time, it is an agency often criticized for not achieving enough. Part of
this criticism undoubtedly results from the negative eﬀects caused by a chronic lack of funding. Another
part of the criticism, however, comes from a deep-seated belief that they agency’s priorities are too deeply
intertwined with the federal government’s national policy agenda and are not suﬃciently responsive to
the needs of those who receive its services. This paper examines both of these criticisms in light of the
transformation of the Indian Health Service from a dominating, centralized federal agency to an agency
redeﬁning both its cause and its structure in a time of expanding Indian sovereignty. The paper concludes
with an analysis of how the Indian Health Service can support the expansion of sovereignty by pursuing
1policies that do not just mimic national trends, but that instead develop from cooperation and negotiation
with tribal “almost-equals.”
Introduction
Indian health status is alarmingly poor. American Indians1 have a ﬁve-year lower life expectancy than the
general US population, are 770 percent more likely to die from alcoholism, 420 percent more likely to die
from diabetes and 280 percent more likely to die an accidental death. American Indian youth are twice as
likely to commit suicide2.
Nonetheless, these statistics represent signiﬁcant improvements in Indian health indicators over the last
thirty years. These improvements include a decrease in mortality rates of tuberculosis (78%), gastrointestinal
diseases (77%), accidents (56%), pneumonia and inﬂuenza (48%), and homicide and alcoholism (33%).3 In
addition, a recitation of these statistics masks an impressive transformation in the delivery of health services
to the Indian population, a transformation marked by the transfer of responsibility for Indian health services
from the federal government to the tribes.
This paper places the transformation of the delivery of Indian4healthservices in the context of the development
1I use the terms American Indian and Indian interchangeably; for the purposes of my paper, this description does not
include Alaskan or Hawaiian Natives. While some scholars might choose to use the term Native American instead of Indian,
many Indian scholars do not. They argue that everyone born in the United States is a Native American, and that the term
exempliﬁes colonial eﬀorts to subordinate sovereignty to ethnicity. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty
through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 Colum. Hum. Rights. L.
Rev. 235, 237 (1997).
2US Commission on Civil Rights, Broken Promises: Evaluating the Native American Health System 8 (2004).
3George R. Brenneman, et al., Health Status and Clinical Indicators in American Indian Health, in American Indian Health:
Innovations in Health Care, Promotions and Policy (Johns Hopkins University Press 2000), 104.
4Government agencies do not use a unitary deﬁnition for “who is an Indian.” For the purpose of eligibility for federal health
care funds, the federal government deﬁnes “an Indian” as a member of recognized tribe, regardless of blood quantum. For US
census purposes, an Indian is anyone who declares herself to be one. See Jack Utter, American Indians: Answers to Today’s
Questions (University of Oklahoma Press 2001), 25-27. Tribes retain the right to determine their own membership using a
2of the federal-Indian and state-Indian relationships from the New Deal era to the present day. Because the
development of the federal Indian relationship mimics many of the broader changes in the administrative
state, the paper will look at how the shift from a top-down administrative order to a governance model has
aﬀected Indian sovereignty. In doing so, the paper will seek to answer the question of whether a shift in
governance promises to beneﬁt the Indian population by moving it closer to equal health status or whether
steps toward equal status will again prove illusory.
In answering this question, the paper will review the divergent approaches of the legislature, executive, and
judiciary to the development of tribal sovereignty. The paper will also examine the role tribes have played
in using the administrative trend toward governance to assert their sovereignty in the delivery of health
services. It will conclude with the observation that federal Indian health policy can incorporate broader
national policies without jeopardizing Indian health goals as long as there is suﬃcient cooperation and
equalization of bargaining power to protect tribal interests.
Sociopolitical, Moral and Legal Foundations for the Provision of Health Services to American Indians
The government provides health services to American Indians for sociopolitical, moral, and legal reasons.
The degree to which each of these reasons has inﬂuenced federal Indian policy depends on the era and the
nature of the political administration in power. Each of these reasons, however, continues to provide impetus
variety of criteria. While some tribes require members to prove that they have a certain blood quantum, others have moved
away from the use of blood quantum and have adopted descent criteria. The question of “who is an Indian” continues to be very
controversial, particularly in light of the government’s publication in 2000 of proposed regulations on the standards required
for Indians to “receive a certiﬁcate of degree of Indian blood.” See David Wilkins, American Indian Politics and the American
Political System, (Rowman & Littleﬁeld 2002), 25-27.
3to the government’s provision of health care to Indians to the present day.
Sociopolitical Objectives
The ﬁrst formal appropriation for Indian health needs was for $40,000 in 19115, but the government has
provided Indians with some form of health services since the mid-1800s.
The provision of health care in the 1800s was one of the many ways in which the government sought to
assimilate and “civilize” the Indian population.6 While assimilation and civilization were not the only reasons
behind the provision of care to the tribes, the government believed that the providers could successfully
use the beneﬁts oﬀered by Western medicine to persuade the tribes to accept Western ways, including
Christianity.7 By the mid-1890s, missionaries had also begun using medical assistance as a way to spread
Christianity.8 Both the early missionaries and the government were particularly keen to replace the Indians’
inherently religious healing ceremonies with Western medical care and religion. A missionary from the
Christian Reformed Church described these dual religious and medical goals when he stated that the medical
missionary “must ﬁrst be a missionary and then a doctor.”9
5Emery A. Johnson & Everett R. Rhoades, History and Organization of the Indian Health Services and System in American
Indian Health, in American Indian Health: Innovations in Health Care, Promotions and Policy (Johns Hopkins University Press
2000), 74.
6Robert A. Trennert, White Man’s Medicine: Government Doctors and the Navajo, 1863-1955 (University of New Mexico
Press 1998), 52. See also Loretta Fowler, Tribal Sovereignty and the Historical Imagination (University of Nebraska Press
2002), 44. The federal government considered the establishment of boarding schools, among other federal Indian policies and
programs, to be part of the “Great White Road.” The purpose of the “Great White Road” was to ensure that Indians would
eventually assimilate and become self-supporting.
7Id.
8Trennert, supra note 6, at 79
9Wade Davies, Healing Ways: Navajo Health Care in the Twentieth Century (University of New Mexico Press 2001), 19.
4Perhaps because of the government’s emphasis on achieving sociopolitical and religious objectives10, rather
than on the quality of care, health services for the Indian population throughout the 1800s were consistently
under-funded and for the most part exceedingly poor.11 The Indian Oﬃce doctors were often employed as
the result of political favors and tended to be either terribly incompetent or ineﬀective.12 Exemplifying the
sociopolitical goals of the government at that time are Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs regulations from 1884 which
state, “The chief duty of an agent is to induce his Indians to labor in civilized pursuits.”13
While sociopolitical goals continue to play a role in the way in which the government funds Indian health
care, the goals have changed. Geared toward assimilation and “civilization” from the 1800s to the mid-1900s,
the government’s policies began to change in the 1960s. This change occurred for two reasons. First, it was
clear that 150 years of assimilation eﬀorts had failed. Second, the government could no longer ignore the
tribes’ increasingly politically sophisticated demands to be respected as the nation’s original inhabitants and
treated as self-governing entities.
Nevertheless, the government continued to make sure that its Indian policy was consistent with its own
sociopolitical goals. Because one of the government’s main goals at this time was to help minorities enjoy the
same beneﬁts that mainstream America enjoyed, it agreed to include the Indian population in its antipoverty
and health access programs. In addition, because it sought to expand the economic and political participation
of minorities, the government encouraged tribes to play a role in the administration of these programs.14
The government’s sociopolitical goals, and consequently the shape of its policies concerning Indians, shifted
once again in the 1980s. During the 1980s, the Reagan Administration cut the budgets of most of the
10David W. Daily, Battle for the BIA (University of Arizona Press 2004), 80.
11Trennert, supra note 6, at 61
12Id. at 72
13Marks, In a Barren Land (William Morrow and Company 1998), 201.
14Mark Edwin Miller, Forgotten Tribes (University of Nebraska Press 2004) 32.
5government’s social welfare programs, including federal assistance for Indian health. Many western tribes
felt that Reagan viewed them as “stumbling blocks in the development of the West,” and perceived the
administration as generally hostile to Indian interests.15 While this may have been true for interests that
the tribes and the government did not share, such as increased funding for Indian needs, the government’s
self-help philosophy was actually quite compatible with the tribes’ desire and demands to increase their
self-governance.16 This meant, at least in the area of support for self-governance, that the government could
again pursue its own sociopolitical goals under the guise of supporting Indian interests.
Since the mid-1990s, the government has pursued sociopolitical goals of decentralization and privatization
of services and government programs. It has been successful in combining its sociopolitical goals of decen-
tralization and privatization with its policy of expanding sovereignty for Indians, particularly in the health
care arena where it has sought to decrease the government’s role in the direct provision of services.
While the government’s sociopolitical objectives may changed throughout the years, it has remained the
case, since the days of assimilation and Christianization, that the government’s sociopolitical goals are borne
out in its approach to Indian aﬀairs in general, and to Indian health policies in particular.
Moral Obligations
The government’s moral responsibility to compensate the native population for the devastation the tribes
experienced during westward expansion is an important reason why, more than three hundred years after the
settlers colonized North America, the US continues to provide health care to the American Indian popula-
15Marks, supra note 13, at 352.
16Id.
6tion.17 The government rarely expresses this moral responsibility explicitly18; a tacit understanding exists,
however, that the government will continue to provide services to American Indians until their economic and
health status approximates that of the general US population.
No matter how tacit the understanding of the existence of moral responsibility, it is hard to dispute that
the American Indian population has a moral claim for some sort of long-term compensation, if not for the
delivery of services in perpetuity. The claim is moral rather than legal in nature because it is not captured in
the speciﬁc rights the government negotiated with tribes that found expression in treaties. It also has little
to do with the concept of reparations, or monetary compensation for the speciﬁc injuries to Indian tribes
or families caused by acts of the government that are now considered illegal on a national and international
level.19 It is simply an understanding that the government does not want to be responsible for wiping out
or keeping impoverished an entire group of people.
The arrival of the settlers was truly devastating to the Indian way of life. In 1871, buﬀalo herds, a signiﬁcant
17The government also compensates tribes by providing them with funds and technical assistance in the areas of education,
housing, management of resources, and development of tribal governments and courts. See Utter, supra note 4, at 63.
18The government’s general referencing of its moral obligations to American Indians is illustrated by President Clinton’s
1997 proclamation of American Indian Heritage Month in which he stated: “...In recognition of America’s moral and legal
obligations to American Indians and Alaska Natives , and in light of the special trust relationship between tribal governments
and the Government of the United States, we celebrate National American Indian Heritage Month.” Id. at 52.
19In thinking about the government’s moral obligation to American Indians, it is important to distinguish it from a similar
obligation one could argue the government owes to African-Americans. Just like the inequalities created by the government’s
assault on Indian existence, the government’s complicity in the practices of slavery, Jim Crow, and housing discrimination
resulted in deep seated economic, educational and health inequalities between the African American and white populations
that persist today. Nevertheless, American Indians continue to receive government beneﬁts, at least in part as a means
to compensate for the government’s racist policies, while African-Americans receive no special treatment from the government
(with the arguable exception of aﬃrmative action). While one could argue that both groups are equally entitled to compensation
for the moral failures of the government – and to economic reparations for speciﬁc injuries – there appear to be three reasons
why the government has consistently treated American Indians diﬀerently. The ﬁrst is that tribes are sovereign nations who
were “ﬁrst in time, ﬁrst in right” and who at one point negotiated and signed treaties with the government. No other group
can claim that status. Id. at 14. The second reason is that the tribes still hold lands as an identiﬁable, non-assimilated
group; this facilitates the identiﬁcation of the population that deserves services as well as provides as a physical reminder of the
wholesale change in lifestyle that followed in the wake of the government’s Indian policies. The third reason is historical and
institutional; infrastructure for the provision of services to American Indians has existed since the 1800s and the government
would be hard-pressed to explain why it should dismantle this infrastructure when health and socioeconomic inequalities persist.
The government likely also has a more self-interested reason for maintaining this infrastructure in terms of wanting to ensure
its own institutional survival.
7source of food for the Plains Indians as well as integral part of their spiritual life, numbered 15 million. By
1903, only 34 buﬀalo remained in the entire country.20 The loss of land, although not as rapid, was similarly
devastating. Between 1817 and 1843, the government forced any remaining Indian tribes with landholdings
east of the Mississippi to move west to open lands for white settlement.21 The forced migration was largely
the result of President Jackson’s Indian Removal Bill which the Congress passed in 1830 and which gave
the president authority to “transfer any eastern tribe to trans Mississippi area.”22 For the most part, the
government paid for the lands relinquished by the Indians. Nevertheless, the consideration the government
oﬀered was so minimal that it could not sustain tribal populations who had no way to survive once the
money ran out. An example of this meager consideration is government’s payment of $30,000 in goods and
horses and a ﬁve-year annual cash annuity of $10,000 to the Caddos tribe in exchange for a million acres of
land in Louisiana.23
Even when the government oﬀered alternative lands in compensation for what it took from the tribes, its
unwillingness or inability to enforce native land claims led to white settlers simply moving onto Indian lands
of their own accord. Oftentimes this was not the fault of the federal government but was a result of the
state’s eagerness to seize Indian lands. States routinely encouraged settlers to take over and to start farming
or ranching or on Indian lands. In 1895, for example, settlers successfully prevented an agent from removing
white intruders from Indian lands in spite of the fact that the agent had 50 men with him.24
For most tribes, this continual encroachment by states and settlers meant that movement to reserved lands
20Shannon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments (University of Oklahoma 1989), p. 69.
21Marks, supra note 13, at 62.
22The forced migration of the Cherokees, known as the Trail of Tears, resulted in the deaths of 8,100 Cherokees. Wilkins,
supra note 4, at 130.
23Marks, supra note 13, at 68.
24Marks, supra note 13, at 216.
8further out West was their only chance to retain their way of life and to establish another homeland. It
would turn out in many cases, however, that reservation life only led to a slower and more painful death
than the one experienced by those tribes who refused to leave their lands. The soil of the reservation lands
given to the Indians was often too poor to cultivate. Tribes who received rations to supplement whatever
little sustenance they could eke out of the land did not do much better; the rations were often too limited
to stop the ravages of starvation.25 In addition, the government forced the Indians to work for the rations
despite the fact that they were supposed to be part of the government’s payment for lands relinquished by
the tribes.26 In addition to the near extinction of the buﬀalo and exposure to the white man’s diseases, the
malnutrition that resulted from the loss of land caused an incredible diminishment of the Indian population.
By 1880, Indians had suﬀered a loss of 95 percent of their population and numbered just 125,000.27
The decline in the Indian population, combined with the increased dependence on the government and the
destruction of their way of life, led many tribal leaders and members to become despondent about the future
and to dream of the past. This sentiment resonates in a statement made by Ten Bears of the Comanches:
“I was born upon the prairie, where the wind blew free, and there was nothing to break the light of the
sun. I was born where there were no enclosures, and where everything drew a free breath. I want to die
there, and not within walls...Why do you ask us to leave the rivers, and the sun, and the wind and live
in houses?”28 Many Indians, however, realizing that they would never be able to return to the traditional
ways of life, adapted their way of life to the reservations.29 The problem was that the government did not
want the Indians to ﬁnd a way to sustain or adapt their culture by minimizing the inﬂuence of the white
man. Instead, it wanted the tribes to acknowledge that native culture was inferior and to embrace western
25Id. at 205.
26Id.
27O’Brien, supra note 20, at 76.
28Marks, supra note 13, at 187.
29Fowler, supra note 6, at 42.
9ways. While the Indians recognized these pressures, they continued to resist the white man’s inﬂuence.
They thought, perhaps, that after forcing them to surrender their original homelands and giving them less
valuable land in exchange, the government would eventually leave them alone.
Nevertheless, despite government assurances that the tribes would not lose any more land if they accepted
reservation life, the government continued to strip the Indians of much of their reservation land throughout
the 1930s.30 The government’s allotment policy, promulgated in 1887 by Senator Dawes as a way to accul-
turate the Indian population by encouraging individual property ownership, was the primary source of the
continued loss of lands.31 The Dawes Act divided the reservation lands into individualized farm or grazing
plots. The government held these divided plots of land in trust for 25 years, after which time the Indians
received title and could decide whether to sell, to lease or to continue to farm the land themselves. The
government could also sell the lands that it had not distributed in the allotment despite the fact that the
lands were part of the reservation that they government had promised to the tribe. Because this “leftover”
land tended to be the most fertile pieces of the reservation, the government had many buyers.32 By the end
of the allotment period, it had sold 60 million acres of these “leftover” lands.33
It was not only because of the government’s sale of “surplus” lands that Indians lost land during this time.
After the 25-year trust period ended, and Indians received title to their lands, many had no way to generate
income aside from selling the lands.34 They had no capital to buy necessary tools, nor the skills needed to
become adept farmers, particularly on the poor soil of the reservation lands. Nor did they have the ability to
30David Wilkins, From Time Immemorial: The Origin and Import of the Reserved Rights Doctrine, in Native Voices:
American Indian Identity and Resistance, (University Press of Kansas 2003), 81.
31Id.
32Id.
33O’Brien, supra note 20, at 78.
34Id.
10enter the work force. The situation of the Indians who received title to their lands, then, was somewhat akin
to the situation of freed slaves. Even though they were free, many former slaves ended up working on the
same plantation, not only because they lacked necessary capital and skills to either start their own business
or buy land, but because racism often kept them out of wage work.
Unable to make a living farming or working, and desperate for money, many Indians sold or leased their
lands to whites for much less than the lands were worth. Others relinquished their lands to the government
when they could not aﬀord to pay taxes on it. The statistics reveal the rapid nature of the loss of land that
resulted. In 1887 when the allotment policy began, Indians held an estimated 138,000,000 acres. By 1934,
when government oﬃcially ended its allotment policy, Indian landholdings amounted to 48,000,000 acres.35
Westward expansion, the creation of reservations, and the consequent destruction of the tribal way of life
wrought such long-lasting damage on the health and welfare of the native population that the population
never recovered. Until recently, Indian health indicators were well below the national average, despite the
provision of “free” health care.36 And despite some improvements in economic well-being, Indians continue
to be one of the poorest groups in American society.37 In compensation for the persistent negative eﬀects
of the government’s past policies, the government recognizes that it continues to have a moral obligation to
provide services, especially in the area of health care.
Some might argue that moral obligations are a weak argument for continued government funding of Indian
35Utter, supra note 4, at 217.
36Even though Indians who use government health services do not have to pay out of pocket, the services are not really what
we would deem “free.” Indians believe that they pre-paid for these services when they ceded their land to government. See
Johnson & Rhoades, supra note 5, at 75.
37C. Matthew Snipp, Selected Demographic Characteristics of Indians, in American Indian Health: Innovations in Health
Care, Promotion and Policy (Johns Hopkins University Press 2000), 52-53.
11services, especially because the government does not fund services for any other group in the same way.
Others might make the argument that the government has an equivalent moral obligation to fund health
services for the 30 percent of the American public that does not have health insurance. For tribes, however,
the discussion of such obligations is an indispensable complement to reliance on a legal structure that not
only lacks consistency but is inherently stacked against Indian interests.38
Legal Responsibilities
The government’s legal responsibility for the provision of services to the Indian population is rooted in
various sources including treaties, statutes, executive orders, and court decisions. Treaties form the backbone
of all federal Indian relations by providing a foundation upon which to build additional legal principles and
responsibilities. Treaties also serve as a written, and therefore indelible, reminder of the promises made by
the government to the Indian population.39 In other words, the treaties have forced the government, if not
always to keep its word, to recognize that the principles of contract and property ensconced in the treaties
are the same principles that deﬁne and legitimize our legal system.40 Yet while the treaties are the source
of important rights, including a speciﬁc right to health services in some instances,41 it is not the rights, but
the status that the treaties confer which has become the central issue in federal Indian relations.
Article II, Section II of the US Constitution gives the executive, with two-thirds consent of the Senate, the
38Glenn Morris, Vine Deloria, Jr. and the Development of a Decolonizing Critique of Indigenous Peoples and International
Relations, in Native Resistance, supra note 39, at 117.
39Between 1789 and 1871, the government and the tribes negotiated 800 treaties. The ﬁrst treaties were negotiated in times of
peace when the tribes and the government had relatively equal bargaining power. The treaties negotiated after the initiation of
westward expansion, however, were characterized by unequal bargaining power between the two parties. As military victor, the
government was able to bargain for favorable terms that left the Indians with very little land. The government also negotiated
many of the treaties in bad faith, oftentimes plying Indian leaders with alcohol before they signed the treaty. Government
representatives similarly encouraged Indian leaders, who the government knew did not represent the entire tribe, to consent to
give away tribal territory.
40Joseph Singer & Joseph Kalt, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule,
Joint Occasional Papers on Native Aﬀairs, 8 (2004).
41Johnson & Rhoades, supra note 5, at 75.
12power to make treaties. Because treaties by their very nature are agreements with other governments,42
the US government was acknowledging the tribes’ status as separate political nations when it entered into
treaties with them.43 However, because of the rapid change in the relationship between the US government
and the tribes from one of two strong sovereigns to one of victor and vanquished, the status of tribes as
independent nations was challenged even while many of these treaties were being negotiated. It is interesting
to note that even though the US government was the military victor, it did not seek to use treaties to end
the tribes’ political independence. Nor did it use military force to put an end to the possibility of ever having
to coexist with another sovereign. Instead, the government chose to continue to respect tribal sovereignty
all the while pursuing goals that would cause its erosion.
The erosion of sovereignty began with the Supreme Court case of Johnson v. McIntosh.44 The decision,
written by John Marshall, attempted to address the inconsistency inherent in the act of signing treaties
with sovereigns who were continually being forced to give up the very thing that conferred sovereignty upon
them – their land. Acknowledging the reality of a westward expanding U.S. population, and the consequent
diﬃculty of allowing the Indians to remain on their lands, Marshall stated that the United States, as the
inheritors of the land from the British discoverers, had the right to control and regulate its use. Pragmatic,
although not necessarily just in his approach, Marshall underscored what he viewed as the inevitable results
of conquest, “However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into
conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the ﬁrst instance, and afterwards sustained; if a
country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates
in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.”45
42Singer & Kalt, supra note 40, at 9.
43Jeﬀrey Ashley & Secody Hubbard, Negotiated Sovereignty (Praeger Publications 2004), 17.
4421 US 543 (1823)
45Id. at 591.
13Marshall nonetheless remained bothered by the contradiction between the established legal principle of “ﬁrst
in time, ﬁrst in right,” and the solution he was advocating. Attempting to forge some sort of compromise, he
recognized that while the tribes did not own the land and therefore did not have any property rights, they did
have rights as occupants of the land.46 In the words of Marshall, “So, too, with respect to the concomitant
principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed,
while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title
to others.”47 Because the Indians did not hold title to their lands, they could not transfer their lands to
anyone else but the United States government.48 With this decision, Marshall made it clear that there would
be no valid challenge to the right of the United States to claim any and all the lands it wanted, with the
caveat that the Indian right to occupation was to be respected.
The battle over state, federal, and Indian sovereignty came to a head in Cherokee v. Georgia,49 a case in
which the Cherokee tribe challenged Georgia’s ability to force them to cede land. The question Marshall
had to answer was whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The Cherokees argued that
because this was a matter between foreign states, the Cherokee nation and the state of Georgia, the Court
had jurisdiction under Article III, Section II of the Constitution. In arguing for their status as a state, the
Cherokee were not asserting that their status was equivalent to that of a state of the union; instead, they
argued that they were another kind of state which was foreign not only to the state of Georgia, but to all
other states, and to the United States government as well.50
Acknowledging that the Cherokee nation ﬁt the deﬁnition of a state, Marshall nonetheless rejected the idea
46Hubbard & Ashley, supra note 42, at 18.
47Johnson, 21 US 543, 603 (1823)
48Dale M. Mason, Indian Gaming: Tribal Sovereignty and American Politics (University of Oklahoma Press 2000), 16.
49Id.
50Mason, supra note 48, at 17.
14that the Cherokee were a foreign state as deﬁned in the Constitution. First, he was unable to reconcile
the Founders’ description of Indian nations as “tribes” in the Indian Commerce Clause with the Cherokee’s
contention that it should be categorized as a foreign state; in other words, if the Founders meant the tribes
to be considered foreign states or nations, it would have not have distinguished them as tribes. Second, and
likely the sticking point for Marshall, was the issue of land. If under Johnson the United States held ultimate
title to the Cherokees’ land, and the Cherokees had signed treaties acknowledging that they were under the
protection of the United States, how could they now assert that they were foreign? Marshall’s answer to this
question was that the Indians retained a status somewhere in between the independent, autonomous stature
of a foreign nation and the reserved right status of the states: “They may, more correctly be denominated
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will,
which must take eﬀect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a
state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”51 Because
the Cherokee were determined to be neither foreign nation or states, the Court declined jurisdiction over the
case.
Because Marshall’s decision dealt only with the question of jurisdiction, the question of what power the
states retained in dealing with the Indian nations remained unanswered. The ﬁnal case in the Marshall
trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, deﬁned the relationship of the tribes to the states and reaﬃrmed the federal
government’s control over Indian aﬀairs. The law in question was a Georgia law rendering it a misdemeanor
for non-Indians to live on Cherokee land without a license from the state. There is absolutely no equivocation
in Marshall’s decision; the state of Georgia has no right to assert jurisdiction over either Cherokee lands or
people: “The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
5130 US 1 (1832)
15accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have
no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the
acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution
and laws, vested in the government of the United States.”52
Marshall’s statement that the Constitution vested all of the powers to regulate Indian aﬀairs in the federal
government led to the establishment of the plenary power doctrine. The government’s plenary power over
Indian aﬀairs has its origins in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the Indian Commerce Clause, which
bestows upon the federal government the power to regulate trade with the Indian tribes. In interpreting this
clause to mean that the states could not exert regulatory power over the tribes, Marshall was asserting that
only the federal government could deal with the tribes on a government-to-government basis.53
While one could interpret Marshall’s decision as an eﬀort to protect the Cherokee nation from the states’
control and to preserve Cherokee sovereignty, one could also interpret the decision as an eﬀort to prevent
state usurpation of federal power. The reality seems to be somewhere in between. Theoretically, Marshall
could have just used the state’s exercise of control over Cherokee lands and people as a means to reassert
federal power, without discussing the reciprocal nature of the government-Indian relationship. Instead, he
emphasized the government’s treaty obligations to the Indian nations, including the provision of protec-
tion “without destruction of the protected” and the recognition of the Indian nations as “distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to
all the lands within those boundaries...” The description of the federal government as protector of the
Indian nations is often referred to as the trust doctrine. These two elements – the trust doctrine and lim-
5231 US 515 (1832)
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16ited sovereignty – would later form the basis for the government’s Indian policies with the trust doctrine
providing the foundation for the creation of the Indian Health Service and limited sovereignty providing the
foundation for self-determination and self-governance initiatives.
Inherent in both the Cherokee and Worcester decisions, however, is the sense that the Indian nations cannot
be wholly sovereign if they depend on the government for protection from the states and for food, shelter,
and other services. Similarly, there is a belief permeating both decisions that the Indians, despite being
under federal protection and having occupancy rights to their lands, will eventually assimilate. Indeed,
while Marshall laments the demise of a once-strong people, he clearly sees this demise as inevitable and
even arguably preferable. Marshall’s rhetoric about the subjugated character of the Indian tribes allowed
later courts to extend Congress’ role beyond that of protector to controller of the tribes in U.S. v. Kagama:
“...but these Indians are within the geographic limits of the United States. The soil and people within these
limits are under the political control of the government of the United States.”54
Following on the heels of US v. Kagama, the Court’s decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock further expanded
Congress’ control over tribes.55 In the case, the Kiowa tribe challenged the validity of the terms of a
treaty on the ground that Congress had entered into the treaty in bad faith. The alleged bad faith was
Congress’s act of signing the treaty despite its knowledge that only a minority of the tribe had agreed to the
treaty terms. Asserting that Congress’ plenary power over the tribes had always been political, and could
therefore not be controlled by the judiciary, the court refused to review Congress’ actions.56 In stating that
“when...treaties were entered into between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that
the power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that...such power might be availed of from considerations
54US v. Kagama, 118 US 375, 379 (1886)
55Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 US 553 (1903).
56Id. at 565
17of governmental policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians”, the court
dispensed with Marshall’s protective language and replaced it with the language of total dominance.57 As
the American Indian scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. notes, the Supreme Court was rewriting history when it
stated in its decision that “Congress had always had absolute power over Indians and their property”; such
an assertion was “fraudulent on its face considering the long history of treaties with the tribes.”58
Historian David Wilkins has further delineated the judicial irresponsibility that characterized the Lone Wolf
and Kagama decisions, accusing the justices of employing “masks like ‘wardship’, ‘dependency’, ‘savagery’,
‘primitivism’, ‘plenary power’, ‘political question,’ in various ways to achieve whatever ends they deem
viable.”59 Wilkins believes that there is no question that “it was the Court, not the [indigenous nation], the
individual, the states or even Congress, which retained plenary discretion to decide the scope of Congress’s
powers and the degree, if any, to which treaty rights were to be protected.”60 In other words, the Court
abrogated its judicial role by leaving the question of treaty rights to Congress.
The legal principles that emerged out of these early cases, including Congress’s plenary power over tribes,
its trust responsibility toward tribes, and the lack of state jurisdiction over tribal lands continue to evoke
emotional response and vigorous debate to this day. The debate, however, has taken on even greater import
since tribes have begun expanding their exercise of sovereignty. Perhaps the most vital question emerging
out of the debate over how Marshall’s seminal framework aﬀects the expansion of sovereignty is how the
government and the tribes can reconcile expansions of sovereignty with continued Indian dependence on
the federal government, not only for the services it provides but also for the continued recognition of tribal
57Id. at 566
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18legitimacy.
A governance framework under which the federal government devolves greater power to the tribes as part of
a larger decentralization eﬀort might provide one answer about how to reconcile these conﬂicting realities.
However, it is unclear that governance will have much meaning for the tribes without greater legislative
(and judicial) acknowledgment of sovereignty. Without such recognition, Congress will retain the ability to
terminate its decentralization policy at any time, potentially leaving the tribes once again questioning their
status and identity as sovereigns.
Nor does decentralization solve the conﬂict inherent in requiring the federal government to continue to
comply with its trust responsibilities while stripping it of its plenary power over tribal aﬀairs. While it
is not impossible to imagine a one-sided trust doctrine under which the government continued to have a
responsibility to fund and to protect tribes but no could no longer exercise any control over Indian aﬀairs,
it is unlikely that Congress will want to change the reciprocal nature of the trust doctrine. Nevertheless,
as the tribes move further toward developing the ability to become their own guardians, rather than the
wards of the federal government, such a one-sided trust doctrine remains a possibility. A strong argument
for the development of a one-sided trust doctrine is that the transfer of actual control and power, rather
than a mere shift of resources, is critical to the success of any governance regime, and particularly critical
to the development of Indian self-governance. Indeed, decentralization to states and to private parties does
not work if the federal government is pulling the strings in the background.
Whether or not the solution is changing Marshall’s trust doctrine, there is room for governance to succeed
between the dominance/protection principles espoused by Marshall, and sovereignty as exempliﬁed by the
19complete takeover of all services by the tribes without any Congressional control. Fashioning a compromise
that suits the power, independence, and ﬁnancial priorities of both the government and the tribes, how-
ever, will be a challenge. For the government to meet this challenge successfully, it will have to align its
sociopolitical goals, moral obligations, and legal responsibilities more closely with those of the tribes.
The Creation of the Indian Health Service
On a micro-level, the story of the Indian Health Service is the story of a shift from dependence to self-
management in Indian aﬀairs. On the macro-level, it is the story of a shift in government regimes from
New Deal to governance. As such, it provides the perfect lens through which to examine the potential of
governance to oﬀer not only a truer form of sovereignty to the tribes but also improved health care.
The Indian Health Service has its origins in the Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs (BIA). The BIA was responsible for
the provision of Indian health services until 1955 when the government transferred that responsibility to the
Public Health Service (PHS).61 Through the 1920s, the health care arm of the BIA functioned as a vehicle
for the government’s assimilationist goals.62 It did so by serving as a support organization to the boarding
schools the government had developed to encourage Indian children to adopt the ways of the whites.63 The
majority of these schools got their start in the late 1800s when the government faced the question of what to
do with the members of the numerous tribes whose defeat had rendered them dependent on the government.
It made sense that the government responded to this question with a plan for assimilation. Indeed, by
retaining a limited degree of sovereignty for the Indian tribes, the Marshall decisions had made it diﬃcult for
61Johnson & Rhoades, supra note 5, at 74.
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20the government to alter the independent status of the tribes through legislation, thus leaving the government
to use assimilation as a way to induce the tribes to relinquish their independence. Many tribes, aware that
the failure to educate their children would lead to further impoverishment and dependency, embraced the
opportunities provided by the boarding schools.64 They did so even despite their understanding of the
government’s assimilationist intent.65
Regardless of strong initial Indian support for these schools, the government realized that unless the children
were healthy when they returned to their homes, Indian parents would likely withdraw their children from
the schools and the government’s assimilation project would fail. Concern for the health of the children
was not misplaced. The boarding schools often served as incubators for numerous diseases which spread
fairly rapidly due to the proximity of the children to one another.66 Serious health disasters often ensued
when children who had contracted infectious diseases on the reservation returned to their schools where
the disease would spread throughout the student population.67 While many boarding schools oﬀered the
children quality health care, there are also numerous examples of boarding schools that oﬀered extremely
poor medical treatment and did nothing to improve dangerous living conditions.
In perhaps the most egregious examples of medical neglect at the boarding schools, seven Indian children
died and 35 became sick from a typhoid epidemic at the Sherman Institute boarding school in 1904.68 This
was in addition to four children who had died from typhoid earlier that year. While contracting typhoid was
not an unusual occurrence in that era, it was unusual for such a large number of students to die. Out of a
64Fowler, supra note 6, at 24.
65In fact, the Cherokees protested the government’s eﬀorts to make them pay for the schools, citing the government’s treaty
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21population of 1,009,500 in California, 28 people died from typhoid in 1904.69 Comparing this number to the
seven deaths out of 600 students at the Sherman Institute, a much higher proportion of deaths per population
occurred at the school than occurred in the general population of the region.70 Even more unusual than
the deaths, however, was the head of the school’s failure to say anything more than “in the fall of the year,
we were troubled with some sickness” in the annual report about the school he sent to the Commissioner of
Indian Aﬀairs.71 Speculation persists about why he failed to report the deaths. At least one author suggests,
however that his failure to report the deaths and illnesses is reﬂective of the government’s belief that the
ends often justiﬁed the means in its attempt to assimilate and civilize the Indian population.72
Additional evidence for this conclusion comes from the Oﬃce of Indian Aﬀairs’ practice of enrolling Indian
students with active tuberculosis in the boarding schools despite knowledge of the potential for a public
health crisis.73 A statement made by Commission of Indian Aﬀairs William Jones in 1904 captures the
government’s belief that the ends of assimilation justiﬁed most, if not all, means: “The physical welfare of
the Indian is, and always must be the fundamental consideration in the scheme to educate or civilize him.
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22It is impossible to develop his mental and moral capabilities without healthy material to work on.”74 The
government’s fear was that if it disregarded the health of the native population, American Indians would be
unable to work and would become permanently dependent on the government.75
Regardless of the motivation for its provision of services to Indians, the government experienced some success
in its eﬀorts to improve Indian health during the early 1900s.76 In 1908 and 1912, the Oﬃce of Indian Aﬀairs
carried out scientiﬁc studies to determine the source of Indian health problems. Finding that poor sanitary
conditions and facilities served as incubators for infectious and other diseases, the Oﬃce fought for and won
increased appropriations for Indian health care.77 Nevertheless, the sheer gravity of the medical problems
overwhelmed even these larger appropriations. Nearly three-ﬁfths of Indian infants died before they were
ﬁve and epidemics of tuberculosis and trachoma persisted.78
During World War I, however, the government scaled back on its provision of services to Indians. This
resulted in a rather severe decline in the health and welfare of all Indian populations.79 Many reservations
had no doctors on site and most supplies became prohibitively expensive.80 While the retraction of services
was due in part to the government’s decision to transfer funds from Indian services to the war eﬀort, the
retraction also occurred because of the plethora of doctors and nurses who left the Indian health service
to serve in the military or to accept private employment.81 The fact that many of their replacements were
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23unqualiﬁed also had a signiﬁcant impact on the quality of care.82 Even in peacetime, the frequency with
which providers entered and exited the Indian Health Service, and the relatively poor quality of those who
remained in the service, would continue to be a signiﬁcant problem for the HIS. As it would in any business
requiring skilled and trained employees, this kind of turnover greatly hampered the eﬀorts of the IHS to
improve health services.
In 1921, Congress passed the Snyder Act, the ﬁrst legislative authorization of continued support for federal
Indian programs, including programs for the “relief of distress and conservation of the health of Indians.”83
Appropriations increased for health care fairly soon after the passage of the act, allowing the BIA to build
hospitals and tuberculosis sanatoriums on reservations.84 In the case of the BIA’s work on the Navajo
reservation, hospital construction increased between 1920 and 1928, leading to a rise in the number of
available hospital beds from 184 beds in 1920 to 268 beds in 1929.85 The number of staﬀ rose accordingly,
including an increase in the number of ﬁeld nurses who could visit the Navajo hogans with health information
and could oﬀer basic care.
As demonstrated by the results of a survey of residents who used the services of the ﬁeld nurses between
1930 and 1950, the residents largely accepted and appreciated the care oﬀered by the IHS nurses.86 Ac-
cording to the survey, residents were more likely to accept the care if no equivalent for that care existed in
Indian medicine. For example, residents widely accepted smallpox vaccinations and agreed to have surgery
performed by government nurses and doctors because traditional healers could not respond to these medical
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24problems.87
Nevertheless, there was far from a complete embrace of Western medical approaches among the Indian
population as many Indians continued to reject Western medicine in favor of traditional healers, and to
resist entering sanatoriums. This was particularly true when the Western approach required Indians to leave
their families and spend lengthy amounts of time in sanatoriums or hospitals. Many Indians were also afraid
of sanatoriums because of the seemingly large numbers of people who would enter them and die. While
the high death rate from tuberculosis in the sanatoriums was more likely indicative of the tendency of the
American Indians to wait until they were gravely ill to seek any treatment rather than a result of provider
incompetence, it is understandable that many Indians would perceive the high death rate as being the result
of poor care. Despite the reluctance of some Indians to enter sanatoriums or hospitals, the government
experienced greater success in stemming the spread of infectious diseases throughout the early 1900s than it
had ever before experienced.88 Much of this success was undoubtedly due to the public health methods the
ﬁeld nurses used to educate the Indian population about the origins of the disease and means of prevention,
rather than successful sanatorium treatment.
In addition to the Snyder Act, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 and the release of the Meriam Report
in 1928 helped catalyze the renewal of government eﬀorts to improve the delivery of health care to the
Indian population in the postwar period. Prior the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act, the government
considered those Indians who had not gained citizenship through marriage or through cession of their tribal
membership to be members of their tribes only.89 While some Indians viewed the extension of citizenship
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25as merely one more tactic in the government’s eﬀorts to assimilate the Indian population90, other Indians,
particularly those who had returned from ﬁghting for the United States in World War I, both wanted and
believed that they deserved the same rights as United States citizens.91 Viewing themselves as both citizens
of their tribe and of the United States, these veterans were likely some of the ﬁrst Indians to develop this
kind of dual loyalty.92
Although many in Congress were opposed to expanding citizenship to the Indian population, others felt it
was an important way to recognize the service of Indians in World War I. Some Congressmen might have also
believed that citizenship was an important step in encouraging assimilation. Either way, once all Indians
became citizens of the United States, it became more diﬃcult for the government to ignore the diﬃcult
conditions under which they lived.
Ignoring the conditions became almost impossible after the publication of the government-commissioned
Meriam Report.93 A study of the economic and social welfare of the Indian population, the Meriam Report
had well meaning, albeit modest goals for the delivery of health, economic and educational services to the
Indian population. Its objective “was not to say whether the Indian Service has done well with the funds
at its disposal but rather to look to the future and insofar as possible to indicate what remains to be done
to adjust the Indians to the prevailing civilization so that they may maintain themselves in the presence of
90The Iroquois, for example, sent a letter to the United States government declining citizenship. They have never wavered
from that position. See Deloria, Jr., supra note 58, at 19.
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26that civilization according at least to a minimum standard of health and decency.”94 The Report generated
signiﬁcant attention from the media and from the public, many of whom were not aware of the extent to
which the American Indian population remained marginalized in US society.95
The Report found that despite modest improvements, the health of the Indian population was bad as
compared to the white population; in particular, the report noted that Indians suﬀered from much higher
rates of infant mortality and infectious disease. Indeed, the death rate from tuberculosis for Navajos in
Arizona was 17 times higher than the death rate of whites for the same disease.96 In addition, the report
found that sanitation was either deﬁcient or altogether absent; most Indian homes lacked toilets and many
lacked any sort of privy. There were not enough hospitals, and most hospitals lacked equipment and quality
providers. The report identiﬁed greater government appropriations as an important part of the solution to
the crisis, a solution articulated in every report on Indian health since conducted.97
Determined to increase the government and public’s understanding of the desperate situation in which the
majority of Indians lived, the report rejected the assertion that “the Indians prefer to live as they do; that
they are happier in their idleness and irresponsibility” and stated that there was “too much evidence of
real suﬀering and discontent to subscribe to the belief that the Indians are reasonably satisﬁed with their
condition.”98 The report was equally clear about where the blame for such suﬀering lay: “Several past
policies adopted by the government in dealing with the Indians have been of a type which, if long continued,
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27would tend to pauperize any race.”99
Pauperization was an apt description for what happened to the Indian population between the time the
government conﬁned them to life on reservation lands and the date of the Meriam Report. By the onset
of the Great Depression, most Indians who had held on to their allotted lands and had attempted to make
a go of it by farming, ranching, or leasing were no longer able to earn a suﬃcient income to support their
family.100 While these Indians still had an option to sell their land, albeit at a devastatingly low price,
most Indians no longer had any land left to sell. By one historian’s estimate, “two-thirds of America’s
Indians were either completely landless or did not own enough land to make a subsistence living.”101 The
combination of discrimination, lack of education, and poor health meant that the majority of wage jobs were
also unavailable as sources of income. In fact, in 1928, at a time when the average income-earner in America
earned approximately $900 a year, more than 50 percent of the Indian population earned less than $200
a year. Even those Indians who earned more than $200 a year still earned signiﬁcantly below the average
American earners, with only 2 percent of the entire Indian population making more than $500 a year.102
While the Meriam Report did increase public and government awareness of the hardships suﬀered by the
Indian population, the awareness did not lead to action until the worst of the Great Depression was over.
In the 1930s, however, recognition of the government’s historical responsibility for Indian health and welfare
would coalesce with increased government involvement in the nation’s economic and social conditions to
produce an “Indian New Deal.”
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28The Advent of the Indian New Deal
The New Deal revolutionized the structure, function, and societal role of the US government. Prior to the
1930s, presidents strongly believed in the power of the invisible hand and were consequently reluctant to
enact social or economic regulations.103 The courts were equally laissez-faire in their approach and had gone
so far as to interpret the Constitution’s due process clause as disallowing government regulation of wages
and hours.104
President Roosevelt believed, however, that the struggle to bring the nation’s economy out of depression
called for a diﬀerent approach in the form of a “New Deal” for Americans.105 Roosevelt advocated numerous
reforms as part of his New Deal plan, the most prominent of which was the establishment of a social
safety net.106 Some of the structural changes resulting from the New Deal included the centralization of
policy generation, the implementation of policy by the federal government, and the subsequent expansion
of the administrative state.107 With the growth of the administrative state came a corresponding increase
in the number of experts employed by the federal government to develop social and economic policy.108
These experts were educated professionals whose qualiﬁcations and experience lent legitimacy to their role
as decision makers for the national polity.109 Taking their places in high-level administrative positions
throughout the government, these experts crafted policies that would “help[ed] to restore our Nation to
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29prosperity and deﬁne[d] the relationship between our people and their Government for half a century”110.
By oﬀering a vision of society and economy that superseded state and local politics, the New Deal trans-
formed people’s expectations of the federal government.111 People believed big government could correct
the deﬁciencies of the market and help establish a more level playing ﬁeld for the disempowered.112 Central
to the focus on improving opportunities for the disempowered was a sense that America should embrace its
cultural pluralism.113 And when the government thought about cultural pluralism, it thought ﬁrst about
America’s original inhabitants, the Indians. It therefore made sense that as the historical “protector” of
American Indians, the Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs was the ideal agency through which to implement policies
that sought to reinforce the importance and preservation of pluralism.114
The government therefore became much more involved in Indian aﬀairs than it had ever been before. Scholars
oﬀer two diﬀerent explanations for the government’s motivation for the creation of an Indian New Deal. The
less benevolent explanation is that because federal regulations already circumscribed the functioning of the
tribes and that because tribes were already accustomed to “rule by a department,” it would not be a stretch
to impose further government policies. This view belies Marshall’s description of the tribes in Cherokee
v. Georgia as “distinct, independent political communities,” and instead envisions them instead as needing
government involvement and organization. In this view, then, government administrators sought to bring
the New Deal to the tribes simply because they could and because they always had.115
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30The less cynical view of the origins of the Indian New Deal is that government administrators viewed the
BIA as an ideal agency through which to implement New Deal legislation because they saw tremendous
potential for positive government action and direction in the area of Indian aﬀairs.116 Like other social and
economic problems the New Deal sought to address, the struggle for cultural survival and better health and
welfare faced by the American Indian population appeared likely to respond to a national vision. This was
particularly true when the government intended to support this vision with better planning and funding
directed at the achievement of speciﬁc goals. That the proposed solutions were national in scope was
essential; despite the Marshall trilogy denying states power over the tribes, Indians continued to suﬀer from
state attempts to usurp their land and to deny them beneﬁts that other state citizens received.117
Unlike the majority of Americans who embraced the recovery from the Depression and the concomitant
implementation of the New Deal, the American Indians were wary of greater government control over their
lives. This fear of government programs made sense considering the damage the government’s previous
policies had had on the culture and welfare of the Indian peoples.118 Roosevelt’s appointed expert on Indian
aﬀairs was John Collier, an anthropologist who earlier in his career had assisted the Pueblo Indians in their
ﬁght for their land. Collier was representative of the New Deal reformers; committed to bettering Indian
economic and social conditions, he had a strong personal sense of the importance of cultural pluralism
and an equally strong belief that the federal government was central to its promulgation.119 What he
and other Indian New Dealers may have lacked, however, was the understanding that top-down legislation
enacted without input from the regulated parties, even if well-meaning, may have unintended and negative
consequences.
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31Collier’s eﬀorts to protect Indian culture and tradition from further erosion resulted in the passage of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”). The Act consisted of ﬁve central components: 1) the
strengthening of the government-to-government relationship between tribes and the federal government; 2)
the end of the allotment policy; 3) increased BIA hiring of Indians; 4) renewed focus on economic development
of the reservations; and 5) helping tribes continue to engage in traditional activities and to speak indigenous
languages.120
While these policies in no way compensated for the destruction of the Indian way of life, they did illustrate
the government’s understanding that it needed to oﬀer the Indian population some way to regroup and
recover from the trauma it had experienced. Recognizing that the Indian population would have to be
integrally involved in directing the recovery if it were to be successful, the IRA encouraged tribal and
resource self-management.121 This was a signiﬁcant departure from the policies of the past, which had
advocated integration with the white population through adoption of white culture and Christian beliefs.122
The hallmark of the IRA’s eﬀorts to increase tribal self-management was the formation of tribal governments.
The establishment of a tribal government required majority approval of the adult members of the tribe or
adult Indians living on a reservation. Once a majority approved the establishment of a government, the
tribe would write a constitution. A majority of the members would then have to ratify the constitution
before it became valid. Subsequently, the members of the tribe would elect a governing council. The council
retained the power to prevent the sale or lease of tribal property, to hire legal counsel, and to negotiate with
government agencies. Additionally, if one-third of the tribal members petitioned the federal government, the
government would prepare a charter of incorporation for the tribe. Another majority vote on incorporation
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32was required before a tribe could use the charter to buy lands or issue shares in the corporation in exchange
for land.
Termination of the allotment policy is widely considered the most successful component of the Act. By
putting an end to both the parceling out of Indian reservations and to the sale of “surplus” land, the IRA
successfully reversed a policy that had caused Indian tribes to lose more than 85 million acres of land by
1934.123 Ending the allotment policy signaled the government’s realization that it could not expect Indians
to be independent if it allowed the source of that independence to continually be “checkerboarded with plots
alternately owned by white settlers, Indians with patented lands, and Indians with land held in trust by the
government.”124 In addition to preventing further loss of land, the IRA granted tribes $2 million in funds
to acquire and consolidate lands under community ownership.125 To provide a source of credit to tribal
corporations, the IRA also established a revolving loan fund of $10 million with an additional $250,000 a
year allocated for loans to Indians seeking higher education.
Despite the success of the IRA land provisions in recovering lands for tribes that had been lost through
allotment, the other provisions of the Act, particularly the formation of tribal governments, have been the
subject of criticism. The majority of the criticism centers on the conﬂicting goals of the IRA. On the one
hand, the IRA stood for aﬃrmation of tribal self-governance and independence. On the other hand, however,
the IRA resulted in a signiﬁcant increase of bureaucratic control over Indian lands and people.
John Collier, Roosevelt’s expert on Indian aﬀairs, often bore the brunt of this criticism. Desiring to preserve
tribal cultures, Collier chose what appeared to be an inapposite means of doing so – the imposition of western
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33governmental structures. The imposition of these structures often caused signiﬁcant discord between tribal
members, tribes, and Indian individuals. In some tribes, for example, mixed-bloods became the majority on
the governing council and limited the political opportunities available to full-blooded Indians.126 In others,
single families dominated the councils, excluding other tribal members from the decision-making process.127
The most problematic aspect of these new tribal governments, however, was the fact that the form of gov-
ernment called for by the IRA did not necessarily ﬁt historical tribal notions of government. For example,
members of many tribes were accustomed to smaller units of government because tribal leaders had tradi-
tionally represented individual villages or bands.128 Although part of the same larger group, these bands
operated autonomously and were often divided on many issues.129 Adding to this confusion was the fact
that the government used an arbitrary approach to determine which bands made up tribes and which bands
were no longer suﬃciently cohesive to be recognized as a tribe.
The approach was arbitrary because it used criteria that did not reﬂect the reality of the Indian experience.
For example, the government required tribes to prove that they had an “unbroken existence” before they
were allowed to form governments.130 In light of the fact that the government had historically combined
diﬀerent ethnic groups for administrative convenience, however, this requirement did not make much sense.131
Indeed, diﬀerent native ethnic groups that had become a social unit when the government placed them on
the same reservation lands were nevertheless denied the right to develop a tribal government.132 Similarly,
the government required that tribes be political units rather than voluntary groupings, a distinction that
126Thomas Cowger, National Congress for American Indians: The Founding Years (University of Nebraska Press 1999), at 20.
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34was not always clear given historical blurring of these lines.133 Arbitrary or not, because both eligibility for
government services and recognition as independent governments depended on the federal identiﬁcation of
a group of Indians as a tribe, the stakes for recognition were high.134
Of course, many tribes foresaw the problems inherent in adoption of alien government structures, particularly
those advocated for by the federal government, and almost one third voted to reject the IRA. Some Indian
individuals took the rejection of the IRA a step further and actively lobbied to abolish it and the BIA at
the same time. These individuals were proponents of assimilation and did not want to see tribes return to
a communal lifestyle and suﬀer further exclusion from the mainstream.135
Like the other New Deal bureaucrats of the time, however, Collier had a national vision for Indian policy,
a vision he did not want to see become derailed because of complaints from a minority group or because of
internal tribal disputes.136 In many respects, however, complaints about the implementation of vision, if not
the vision itself, were legitimate. Instead of granting the tribes signiﬁcant power over their own aﬀairs, the
IRA gave the Interior Department authority over many of the key provisions of the Act including discretion
over tribal constitutions, charters of incorporation, taxes on tribe members and membership guidelines.137
Moreover, while Collier claimed to want to reduce the coercive and top-down nature of the BIA’s relationship
with the tribes, he was not afraid to ﬂex the government’s regulatory muscle to get what he wanted.138
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35While Collier arguably did not go far enough in his pursuit of a New Deal for Indians, much of the current
criticism of his policies seems inapt.139 When he became commissioner of Indian aﬀairs in 1934, most tribes
were living on checkerboard reservations with no opportunity to recover the lands they had lost and limited
opportunity to ﬁnd wage work. Many of their own governmental structures, damaged by assimilation policies
that had sought to diminish the authority of traditional chiefs, were in disarray.140 Nor did American Indians
have much voice or power in national or state politics, or even in BIA decision-making processes. This lack
of voice contributed to a deep distrust of the federal government.
Despite these obstacles, Collier was able to eﬀect some changes that were not only positive but also sus-
tainable. Recognizing that the eﬀort to preserve Indian culture would be equally doomed by the exclusion
of tribes and individual Indians from mainstream social, economic and government structures as it would
be by their assimilation into those structures Collier encouraged tribes to act as modern interest groups by
forming governments that would be cognizable in the American system.141 He also encouraged American
Indian participation in the government through support for the preferential hiring of Indians.142
By creating structures for political participation and increasing the numbers of Indians working in the
federal government, Collier’s policies promoted the development of a pan-Indian identity and of future
Indian leaders.143 The leaders developed during that time would become instrumental in the ﬁght against
termination during the 1950s.
139Deloria, Jr., supra note 58 at 206.
140Fowler, supra note 6, at 99
141Deloria Jr., supra note 58, at 195.
142Cowger, supra note 126, at 24.
143Id at 25.
36World War II, Termination, and Relocation
World War II
While setting the groundwork for future advocacy by Indian leaders in the area of health services, the
transformation of federal Indian policy that took place during the New Deal was too short-lived to lead to
signiﬁcant advances in Indian health care.144 Soon after passing the Indian New Deal legislation, Congress
cut the appropriations that were necessary for its success.145 In addition, the institutional prerogative of the
BIA to control every aspect of Indian aﬀairs quickly began to dilute the goals of the legislation. As a result,
there was little compliance by the BIA with the IRA provision requiring it to consult with the tribes about
the use and amount of government appropriations.146 Moreover, America’s involvement in World War II
reversed any small gains that might have been made during Collier’s early tenure; in fact, as the attention of
the American public and government turned towards the war, Indian health did worse than just not improve
– it visibly suﬀered.147
In large part, the suﬀering was due to the high numbers of providers who left the health department of
the Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs to join or provide health services to the military. By 1944, the shortage of
providers was so great that the government stated that it needed 100 doctors and 188 nurses before it could
provide even basic services to the Indian population.148 Predictably, and perhaps understandably, funding
for government provision of health services also dropped dramatically during this time.149 The rise in prices
144Trennert, supra note 6 , at 200
145Deloria, Jr., supra note 58, at 202.
146Id. at 202.
147The suﬀering of the Navajo and Hopi became national news in 1947 when severe shortages of food and fuel during the
winter exacerbated already poor health conditions. Congress would eventually pass an act to create a rehabilitation program
for the two tribes. Donald Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960, (University of New Mexico
Press 1986), 13.
148Trennert, supra note 6, at 201.
149Trennert, supra note 6, at 205.
37and scarcity of supplies contributed to the crisis, leading the government to close 17 Indian hospitals during
the war.150
Despite these disturbing statistics, the story was not all bad. Restricted in his ability to produce more
providers or hospital beds, Collier turned his attention to aﬃrming the viability of traditional healing prac-
tices.151 Advocating for the combination of traditional practices with western medical approaches, Collier
hired a psychologist and anthropologist to collaborate on a guide about Navajo healing practices for gov-
ernment providers.152 The guide identiﬁed ways in which western providers could improve their cultural
competence.153 Some of the recommendations included avoiding excessive questioning of native patients,
increasing sensitivity to the realities of Indian life on the reservations before prescribing a treatment regimen,
and using interpreters.154
Support for cultural competence waned in the post-war era as the government became reluctant to provide
any health services to Indians. Spurred on by the belief that the tribal structures aﬃrmed during the Indian
New Deal prevented Indians from achieving individual development and success, assimilation again became
the predominant national and Congressional ideology.155 Realizing that the government’s prior attempts
at assimilating American Indians through education, prosleytization and allotment had failed, Congress
proposed a new approach – a one two punch of termination and relocation.
Termination
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38Termination required the government to determine which tribes were ready to function without government
assistance. Once it identiﬁed tribes ripe for termination, the government would strip the tribes of their
legal status as semi-sovereign entities and disclaim its trust responsibility.156 The retraction of the trust
responsibility meant that terminated tribes were no longer eligible for government provided services like
health care and education.157 It also meant that the government no longer held Indian land in trust and
therefore could not restrict its transfer.158 Indians belonging to terminated tribes were therefore free to sell
this land, which many did (and later regretted).159 The withdrawal of the trust responsibility also left the
members of terminated tribes at the mercy of state governments who upon termination not only became
responsible for providing services to tribe members but also retained jurisdiction over them.160 Between
1945 and 1960, in the face of opposition from many tribes, Congress terminated the legal status of over 100
tribes in this manner.161
The primary criteria for termination was a secure economic status, but the government also considered
the “tribe’s human and natural resources, limitations, preparedness and management abilities.”162 While
many of the tribes the government terminated were ﬁnancially sound because of successful settlement claims
or income from oil or mineral royalties163, many were unprepared for termination in other respects. For
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39example, most tribes were not ready to manage their own ﬁnances or negotiate sophisticated oil or mineral
extraction deals with private companies.164
Despite the obvious potential for problems to arise, particularly for those tribes who had money but did not
have a way to manage it, some tribes and many legislators supported termination.165 Both parties viewed
termination as the ideal way to end what they perceived as the government’s over-involvement in Indian
aﬀairs. They saw the Indian New Deal programs as overly bureaucratic and hierarchical; in other words,
a “shadow government” that had been “established to extend federal control over virtually every aspect of
Indian life within Indian country.”166 They believed that termination would free Indians – who had been
constrained by these federal regulations and programs – to experience true self-determination.
Regardless of the supporters’ eﬀorts to distinguish the New Deal bureaucracy from free market termination,
however, the two policies were similar in many respects. Both policies were top-down, centrally imposed,
and crafted with very little comment from the aﬀected tribes.167 And while terminationists believed that
they were both ending government control over the tribes and ending the government’s responsibility for
tribal welfare, they were in fact only shifting responsibility for the tribes from the federal government to the
inasmuch as the Claims Commission required all claims to be related to land cessions or to the government’s accounting of tribal
funds. This meant that there was no forum to address broader claims addressing the government’s failure to deal with tribes
in good faith or its failure to uphold general trusteeship responsibilities. In Gila River Pima Maricopa Indian Community, et
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with adequate education on the ground that the tribe could not point to a speciﬁc treaty provision requiring the government
to provide education to the tribe. Gila River, 427 F.2d 1194, 1197 (US Ct Cl. 1970). The tribe then argued that by originally
asserting its role as guardian of Indian peoples and by aﬃrmatively providing them with services for years, the government had
developed a special relationship with and consequent duty toward the Indian people and had thus exposed itself to liability
claims. Id. The Court of Claims rejected the existence of a special relationship and stated that regardless of its provision of
services over the years, the government had not duty to the Gila River tribe unless there was an underlying contract claim that
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40states.168 After termination, tribes continued to need educational training, health services, and assistance
with managing land and assets if they were to avoid becoming impoverished.169 As a result, “in the years
that followed [termination], most members of terminated tribes would not become middle-class citizens and
would have to settle for lower-class status in American society.”170 In fact, some of the ﬁrst terminated tribes,
having mismanaged their assets and income, requested that the federal government restore recognition to
their tribes during the 1980s.171 Once the government re-recognized these tribes, they became eligible for
health services again.
The passage of Public Law 280 was another critical piece of the federal government’s eﬀort to limit its support
for tribes during the termination period. Public Law 280 gave several states, including Arizona, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, full criminal and some civil jurisdiction over most reservations in their
borders.172 The law contradicted long-time federal policy, which had required states seeking admittance to
the union to insert clauses into their constitution that disclaimed any jurisdiction over the tribal lands within
their state and recognized “the absolute jurisdiction and control of Congress” over Indian lands.173 Despite
the existence of these constitutional disclaimers, the Supreme Court would later support states’ exercise
of jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters by reading the disclaimers as merely prohibiting states from
having a proprietary, and not a government interest in tribal lands.174
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41While touted as an opportunity for independence and self-governance, termination resulted in tribes being
cut oﬀ from the very resources they needed to develop stable self-governance. In addition, termination did not
solve the problems created by the government’s heavy-handed involvement in Indian aﬀairs during the New
Deal period. Instead, it represented just another federal Indian policy crafted without tribal participation
that did nothing to meet serious tribal needs. By causing the government to withdraw from its provision of
services to terminated tribes, termination likely reversed gains in health status that those tribes had made
during the New Deal period.
Relocation
The government’s relocation policy shared many of the same goals and had many of the same eﬀects as the
termination policy.175 For example, the policy arose out of the belief that Indians would eventually prosper
if freed from heavy-handed governmental involvement. It also had the similar eﬀect of increasing the health
and welfare burdens of American Indians.
Relocation was rooted in the idea that many of the American Indians returning from the war, in addition
to those with skills living on the reservations, would beneﬁt from moving to urban areas where there were
better economic opportunities and they could more easily integrate into the US population. In the eyes
of the federal government, once urban migrants adjusted to city life there would no longer be a need for
reservations.176 Nevertheless, despite the BIA’s job training assistance, the unemployment rate of urban
Indians hovered around 40 percent twelve years after relocation began. Many Indians had a diﬃcult time
the termination period. While federal-Indian relations do respond to continually changing notions of federalism, the federal
government rarely chooses to alter its responsibility for tribes or its supremacy in the area of Indian aﬀairs. Id. at 20.
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42adjusting to the cities and suﬀered isolation and loss of morale. Some Indians, however, did ﬁnd urban life
to be less oppressive and poverty-stricken than life on the reservation.177 Overall, more than 160,000 Indians
were forcibly moved from their reservations to cities during this time.178
It was perhaps reasonable for the federal government to think that American Indians could adjust relatively
easily to urban life; after all, unlike the thousands of immigrants who arrived every year and found a
way to adjust to urban life the native population spoke English and held citizenship status. However, not
unlike many African Americans who to this day continue to suﬀer the repercussions of federal policies that
encouraged white ﬂight, segregation, and de facto conﬁnement in urban ghettos,179 many American Indians
struggled to bounce back from a history of discrimination and cultural assault to embrace city life and
assimilation.180 Those that were unable to bounce back usually returned to their reservation. Many of the
younger Indians, particularly those who had previously been oﬀ the reservations, were able to adapt and
tended to remain in the cities.181
Transfer of Responsibility for Indian Health to the Public Health Service
The third prong of termination after the withdrawal of federal recognition of tribes and relocation of Indian
individuals to urban areas was the phasing out of the Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs. The plan for phasing out the
BIA centered on the transfer of the services it provided, such as health care, to other government agencies.182
The transfer of responsibility for Indian health to the Public Health Service (PHS) was the ideal solution
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43in the minds of the terminationists who believed that the BIA’s ineﬀectiveness in addressing Indian health
problems was a primary reason for continued Indian dependency as well as an obstacle to assimilation.183
Their disgust for the BIA was perhaps not unwarranted; a former head of the Indian Health told a story
about how he had succeeded in getting Congress to earmark $30 million for tuberculosis care only to have the
director of the BIA use the money for “other things.”184 Non-terminationists also supported the transfer,
not because they hoped for the eventual termination of government services to Indians, but because they
believed the BIA had been highly incompetent in its delivery of services.185
There were various advantages to transferring the responsibility for health services to the PHS. At the time
of the transfer, the BIA was still struggling to deal with the tuberculosis problem on the reservations in
spite of its many years of attempts to address it.186 A strong source of public support for the transfer was
the fact that tuberculosis among Indians had become a public problem; between 10 percent and 25 percent
of the Indians drafted into the military or employed in defense plants during World War II had had to
return to the reservations because of tuberculosis infection.187 The BIA also struggled to attract and to
retain qualiﬁed providers; reservation doctors were isolated, poorly paid, and subordinate to the local BIA
superintendent.188
The PHS, on the other hand, not only was much more successful than the BIA in recruiting physicians but
was also much more suited to the job of providing health care to American Indians; in fact, the agency
specialized in the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. Their success in
recruitment was due in part to the fact that doctors could work with the PHS in fulﬁllment of their two-year
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44service requirement.189 The better pay and conditions also played a role in the PHS’ recruitment success.190
In spite of resistance from some American Indians who preferred the BIA as the devil they knew, and
resistance from the PHS which was initially opposed to taking on responsibility for Indian health, the Indian
Health Service became part of the PHS in 1955.191
Inﬂuenced in part by the machinations of bureaucrats, the decision to transfer the delivery of health services
to the PHS was also heavily inﬂuenced by the lobbying of various tribes and Indian organizations, especially
the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI). Collier’s eﬀorts to develop native leaders and to establish
a vehicle for their voices came to fruition during this time. It took the shape of advocacy by people like
Annie Wauneka, a member of the Navajo tribal council who played an important role in the passage of the
transfer legislation.192 Highly respected by members of her tribe as well as by government oﬃcials, Wauneka
was central to eﬀorts to expand preventive health eﬀorts on the Navajo reservation.193
Members of other tribes also took on leadership roles in the area of health services at the time of transfer.
The “Lakota grandmas,” a group of women from diﬀerent Lakota reservations, showed a deep commitment
to improving health conditions on their reservations by embracing preventive medicine. However, in addition
to working on the prevention of tuberculosis and other infectious diseases, these “grandmas” were not afraid
to tackle sensitive topics such as alcoholism, mental health problems, and birth control.194
While it could not match the ﬂexibility of these Lakota grandmas in addressing the more taboo health
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45problems on the reservations, the IHS did respond to criticisms by tribal leaders that the BIA had neglected
preventive medicine and had instead focused too heavily on primary care.195 Taking advantage of the
nearly 50 percent increase in Congressional appropriations for American Indian health care that was part
of the transfer legislation, the IHS not only allocated more funds to preventive services, it increased its
staﬀ numbers, rebuilt the ﬁeld nursing program, and established health education programs.196 The IHS
also capitalized on its expertise in the area of public health by directing much of its energy toward the
improvement of reservation sanitation, sewage, and water supply facilities.197 In fact, improving sanitation
on the reservations became one of the most signiﬁcant initial IHS achievements inasmuch as it contributed
to a dramatic decline in infant and gastrointestinal mortality.198
Another important early achievement was the agency’s collaboration with a medical team from Cornell.199
In addition to establishing a very successful clinic on the Navajo reservation, the medical team trained
community members to work as ﬁeld medical assistants.200 The team thus encouraged American Indians to
become actively involved in their own health care delivery.201 Further encouragement came from the team’s
emphasis on cultural competence and communication. Limited in its ﬂexibility and in its bureaucratic
mindset, the IHS took a little bit longer to develop the kind of enthusiasm for feedback on their performance
from American Indians shown by the Cornell team.202 Nevertheless, by the 1960s the IHS had developed
a program whereby representatives from the tribal councils would report to the local IHS service oﬃcer
about health care needs and developments. The IHS would also adopt many of the Cornell team’s practices,
including expanding the participation of Indians in their own care.203
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46Once these lines of communication were open, tribes were not shy about expressing their frustrations with
the agency. In addition to insinuating in cartoons and other forms of media that their doctors had no
more experience than medical interns, American Indians expressed concerns about the high rates of provider
turnover. In most cases, the high turnover was the result of young doctors leaving the reservations after
completing their two years of substituted military service with the IHS.204 Providers also cited the stress
generated by the pressure to adapt quickly to a new culture and medical environment as one of the reasons
why they left the IHS after just a few years of service.205 High turnover rates therefore created a vicious
cycle whereby the more providers who left, the more stress there was on those who remained, and the more
likely it became that those providers would leave. One can hardly blame them: the shortage of providers was
so severe that as late as 1975, the Navajo Nation had only 90 physicians per 100,000 patients while the rest
of the United States averaged 163 physicians for the same number of patients.206 In a survey conducted by
IHS physician Robert Kane, Navajo patients also complained about the language barriers they faced when
trying to communicate with their providers. These issues left some Navajos expressing a desire for the return
of the less qualiﬁed, but oftentimes more dedicated BIA doctors.207
While many of the criticisms lodged against the IHS doctors and services resembled those previously made
about the BIA, there was something qualitatively diﬀerent about the way in which the government delivered
health care to Indians after the transfer. Some of the diﬀerence was due to the increase in the number and
quality of providers, as well as the improvement of facilities and development of community health operations.
Nonetheless, the greatest change that occurred was in the government’s attitude toward providing services,
including a desire to understand better the ways in which Indian people experienced those services. In
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47large part, these changes had to do with the diﬀerent missions of the BIA and the PHS. Whereas the BIA
functioned as the “overseer” of the Indian people and subsequently had little interest in their expressed health
concerns, the PHS specialized in the improvement of health indicators and therefore had greater interest in
listening to concerns. The PHS was also motivated to listen to community members by the results of a study
of Indian health that it carried out under Congress’ direction in 1957.208 The conclusions of the study stated
that, “all plans for increased utilization of community health resources should be developed in cooperation
with the Indians and the community, and will need to be on a reservation-by-reservation basis.”209 Not only
did the study make it clear that any real improvement in Indian health would require Indian input, it also
emphasized the diversity of the Indian experience and the need to tailor health programs to the needs of the
diﬀerent tribes and reservations.
Ascribing the improved communication between the government and the Indians to the eﬀorts of the PHS
alone, however, would be a mistake. Like other bureaucratic agencies left to their own devices, the PHS, while
not as likely as the BIA to ignore Indian concerns, had little incentive to encourage and respond to those
concerns if the recipients of the services were complacent. Indeed, rhetoric about Indian self-government and
management had had its start in the early 1930s. It was at this point, about a decade after the transfer,
however, that tribal leaders and members seized upon this rhetoric and sought to make it a reality. One
of their eﬀorts involved increasing the numbers of American Indian medical professionals.210 During this
time, American Indian individuals widely took advantage of the opportunities oﬀered by the government
to become nurses, doctors and other health professionals.211 In addition to placing more Indians in health
care training programs, tribal leaders sought to become more knowledgeable about the management side of
health care. Participating in programs on health management and planning techniques at the training center
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48the IHS had built in Arizona, tribal leaders began to envision the potential for an expanded tribal role in
the delivery of health services.212 Released at last from the strictures of the BIA, American Indians began
to eﬀectively use the structures of the PHS to make the government more aware not only of the gravity of
the health problems they were facing but also of their demand to play a greater role in addressing those
problems.
The End of Termination and the War on Poverty
Increased Indian activism in the health care arena was part of a broader movement throughout the 1950s
and 1960s to end termination and to expand the participation of Indians in government decision-making
processes. An example of this increased activism was the 1961 American Indian Conference in Chicago.
The participation in the Conference was so enthusiastic, and included so many groups and individuals that
350 tribal and intertribal meetings, and nine regional meetings, took place before the Conference even got
started. The outcome of the conference, the Declaration of Indian Purpose, discussed the frequency with
which local and state agencies were denying health services to eligible American Indians.213 The Declaration
also highlighted tribal and individual Indian needs in other areas such as education and housing.214 Despite
serving as an important rallying tool for pan-tribal activism and organizing, and laying the groundwork for
future sophisticated lobbying and legislative campaigns by Indian organizations, the Declaration had little
eﬀect on the federal government’s approach to Indian policies.215
Tribes were not new to lobbying or to communicating with the federal government. Since the early 1900s,
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49tribes had sent delegations of oﬃcials to Washington to try inﬂuence federal Indian policy.216 All of the
tribes in these early years, however, focused their lobbying eﬀorts on either attaining speciﬁc beneﬁts for
their tribe or demanding federal compliance with treaties. In the 1960s, then, what was new was not that
tribes were lobbying, but that they were joining forces and making concerted demands. Because the pan-
Indian nature of the movement during the 1960s promised greater strength and greater numbers, it led to
greater success than Indian delegations had experienced in the past.217
An example of the success of pan-Indian political action was the American Indian Capital Conference on
Poverty. Indian groups purposefully planned the conference, intended to “secure cooperative national lead-
ership” on the issue of Indian poverty, to occur at the same time as the hearings on President Johnson’s War
on Poverty/Oﬃce of Economic Opportunity (OEO) initiatives.218 Conference delegates met with legislators
to try to convince them that Indians, initially excluded from the War on Poverty, should be included in
Johnson’s initiatives. Delegates also attended workshops on health, education, housing, and employment to
become better prepared for sustained and sophisticated advocacy on those issues.219
Although the conference resulted in the Secretary of the Interior publicly committing to the inclusion of
the Indian people in Johnson’s antipoverty programs, it did little to alter the paternalistic approach and
operation of the BIA.220 BIA oﬃcials saw the antipoverty programs as an infringement upon their jurisdic-
tion over Indian aﬀairs and felt threatened by the establishment of regional oﬃces of economic opportunity
on reservation lands. Their defensiveness derived from a fear that another agency might experience greater
success than the BIA had, not only in improving poverty and health indicators but also in increasing the
economic capabilities and independence of the Indian people.
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220An example of continued BIA heavy-handedness at this time was the Interior Secretary’s decision to terminate the Navajo
tribe’s attorney without the council’s permission. While the Secretary believed the action was necessary to protect tribal
resources, it created a deep rift in between tribe members and arguably retarded the development of tribal sovereignty. Id. at
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50By bypassing the BIA and making funds directly available to tribes, the OEO programs oﬀered Indian
peoples their ﬁrst opportunity since the federalization of Indian aﬀairs in the 1800s to determine what their
priorities were and how they wanted to address them.221 Indeed, the OEO programs were really the ﬁrst time
that Indians had “the right to be wrong and the right to be right.” The Navajo used the funds to create the
ﬁrst school run by a tribe without BIA involvement.222 Other tribes focused on establishing health centers or
Head Start programs. Most importantly, however, the program helped catalyze the development of leaders
by oﬀering tribal members the opportunity to move into decision-making and administrative positions. Many
of those who took on these administrative and decision-making roles later became tribal council members,
leaders in national Indian organizations or political representatives. By oﬀering tribes and individual Indians
their ﬁrst ever “chance to fail,” the OEO programs encouraged Indians to begin organizing around increasing
their self-determination.
Epitomizing the BIA’s negative response to the growing interest in self-determination and consequent rejec-
tion of the BIA by Indians at this time was the assertion by the commission of Indian aﬀairs at the end of
the Capital Conference that “Indians are better oﬀ than Southern Negroes chieﬂy because of the work of the
much criticized Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs. As poor as the Indian people are, the rural nonwhites are much
poorer.”223 Not only was this statement factually incorrect, it belied the reality of numerous BIA failures,
in particular the mismanagement of trust accounts and natural resources.224 In addition, it exempliﬁed
the tired and narrow vision of the agency; instead of ending the conference with a renewed commitment to
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51ﬁxing the problems at the BIA and improving the welfare of the Indian people, the commissioner discounted
complaints about the BIA. In addition, the commissioner’s suggestion that Indians should be content with
the poor conditions they suﬀered because they were better oﬀ than rural African Americans illustrates both
the BIA’s arrogance and the lack of its commitment to its mission.
The Era of Self-Determination
The belief that beggars can’t be choosers, or that Indian people did not have the right to demand more and
better services so long as the government was paying for them, persisted throughout the 1960s. This belief
began to change in the 1970s when the rise of the American Indian Movement, coupled with legislative and
executive support for self-determination, led to a reassertion of sovereignty by Indian peoples. Sovereignty
promised a new relationship with the federal government wherein Indians – not bureaucratic oﬃcials – would
manage tribal health care, education and other social service delivery.
While Johnson’s inclusion of Indians in his OEO programs had signaled a shift in federal policy from
bureaucratic control over Indian aﬀairs to Indian self-determination, the Nixon administration made the
shift a reality by declaring that the government was entering a new era of federal Indian relations. In 1970,
Richard Nixon gave a speech to Congress in which he asked Congress to “begin to act on the basis of what
the Indians themselves have long been telling us...to create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian
future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.”225 This new era would be marked by a decline
in the jurisdiction of the BIA with tribes able to “take over the control [of federal programs]...whenever
the tribal council...voted to do so.”226 Calling termination “morally and legally unacceptable,” Nixon
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52was also the ﬁrst high-level oﬃcial to admit that the government’s policy was a derogation of the trust
responsibility.227
Unlike in the pre-self determination days when the federal government designed and implemented its policies
without consulting with the Indian peoples, by the Nixon era, Indian leaders who had developed leadership
and organization skills during the termination and OEO periods demanded to play a role in shaping legislation
and challenging court decisions. In the 1970s, greater tribal control over health care became an important
rallying call for Indian leaders. Stemming in part from the HIS’ involvement in a few signiﬁcant health
care controversies, the desire for greater tribal control over health care also came from the fact that Indians
continued to have disproportionately poor health outcomes. The ﬁrst IHS controversy centered on evidence
that the number of sterilization procedures conducted on the Navajo reservation had skyrocketed between
1972 and 1978.228 Shocking, these numbers engendered even greater disbelief when one considered them
in light of an unrelated study showing that Navajo women rarely chose sterilization if presented with any
other options. The increased sterilizations appeared to be due to incompetent IHS direction rather than
to a government conspiracy to sterilize Indian women. Nevertheless, the devastating and irreversible eﬀects
of such incompetence caused alarm among Navajo people and catalyzed demands for greater control over
health services. These demands became stronger when the government took little action to remedy the
situation. Indeed, while the government conducted an investigation and the General Accounting Oﬃce
(GAO) published a report, no other action was taken.229
Another controversy that generated greater support for self-determination in health care was the increasing
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53numbers of miners and residents who had become ill after exposure to the uranium mines located on the
Navajo reservation. One study showed that Navajo miners experienced a lung cancer rate of 148 per 100,000
compared to a rate of 1.7 per 100,000 among non-miners.230 Most employers had not made the miners aware
of the potential dangers of the uranium despite Public Health Service studies showing the link between
exposure to radon and cancer.231 This controversy signaled to the Navajo population not only that that it
could not trust the US government to take care of the tribe but that it could and should be more vigilant
about the health risks faced by its members.
The cornerstone of Nixon’s self-determination policy was the Indian Self-Determination and Education As-
sistance Act of 1975.232 The Act called for tribes to take over and administer federal programs if they could
show by tribal resolution that the tribe desired to do so. The programs and services that tribes could choose
to administer ran the gamut from mental health and drug abuse services to programs for community health
representatives to health education programs to facilities construction. The tribes could also choose to ad-
minister direct health services. Once they entered into a contract for services, the tribes could administer
the programs directly or could contract with outside providers.233
The Secretary of the Interior had the ability to decline to enter into self-determination contracts. This
Act limited this ability, however, by requiring that Secretary set forth the reasons why the government was
rejecting the contract.234 Furthermore, the Secretary had to assist any tribe with a rejected contract to
overcome the reasons for the rejection. The legislation also enabled the tribes to appeal the government’s
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54rejection of a self-determination contract in federal court.235 While the BIA was reluctant to relinquish its
control and attempted to slow down the contracting process, the tribes refused to take no for answer and
continued to submit their applications until their contracts were approved. Leaders simultaneously applied
pressure to members of Congress to ensure that the legislation proved to be more than a paper tiger.236
Indian leaders had learned from the successful legislative and executive eﬀorts to dilute the eﬀect of the
Marshall decisions that they could only secure their interests if they had the support of all three branches
of government. Since Nixon clearly favored self-determination, and Congress had acted on his direction in
this area by passing the Self-Determination Act, the judiciary became the important target for advancing
and securing Indian interests. A group of activist Indian leaders called the American Indian Movement
(AIM) worked with traditional indigenous political forces and young Indian lawyers to develop a judicial
strategy. The strategy called for the assertion of treaty claims in US and international forums.237 Leading
to favorable court rulings in the area of ﬁshing and resource rights, the assertion of these claims helped to
turn self-determination into a reality, rather than just a fancy political expression.238
While these decisions were critical to establishing the de jure foundations of the sovereignty movement,
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55tribes have also been extremely successful in asserting de facto sovereignty. One of the areas in which they
have had particular success in exercising de facto sovereignty is in contracting with the government for the
delivery of health services.239
De facto sovereignty is an important complement to de jure sovereignty inasmuch as it acts as an “antidote
to ambiguous or even contrary de jure status.” By competently taking on responsibility for their health
care, tribes “alleviate concerns that Indian citizens’ needs cannot be met by their governments, provide[s]
foundation for operational respect for non-Indian governmental counterparts, reduce[s] litigation, provide[s]
an “out” for the legal system when overburdened judges seek settlement or dismissal of cases that threaten
to bog the system down in the complicated and vacillating area of tribal jurisdiction...”240
Not only have tribes individually exercised de facto sovereignty by running their own health programs, they
have formed intertribal organizations that set larger policy goals for Indian health. One example of such an
organization is the National Indian Health Board (NIHB).241 The NIHB developed out of regional health
boards originally created by tribal governments who wanted assistance in determining tribal health needs.
One of the ﬁrst national Indian-controlled organizations focused on how to run health-care programs, the
NIHB received ﬁnancial support from the IHS.242 The NIHB continues to serve as a central clearinghouse for
239In addition to using the courts to establish treaty rights, the American Indian Movement demanded changes in IHS and
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56studies and information on Indian health. It also continues to act as a policymaking and lobbying body.243
Self-Determination, Self-Governance and Sovereignty: What is the diﬀerence?
While I have so far used these terms interchangeably throughout this paper, scholars would argue that each of
these terms has a diﬀerent meaning, or at the very least a diﬀerent signiﬁcance. For example, Indian scholar
Vine Deloria Jr. rejects the language of self-governance or self-determination. He argues that inherent in
these terms is the implication that tribes need, or are seeking, recognition of their governments from the
more powerful government, the United States. Deloria Jr. has consequently advocated for the use of the
term “nationhood” to describe those tribes that conceive of their exercise of sovereignty and their decision-
making as separate from the inﬂuence of the United States government or people.244 To be independent
decision-makers, the tribes do not have to sever their relationship with the government. It merely means
that tribes take the necessary chances to run their own aﬀairs, build their own government’s capacities, and
strive to be less dependent on the federal government. It also means not following the government’s lead in
terms of policy or ﬁnances unless the tribe has determined that the lead is truly in their best interest. The
exercise of de facto sovereignty, inasmuch as it is tribally determined rather than directed or inﬂuenced by
the federal government, is central to the development of nationhood.
The question of whether contracting with the government to manage and provide services is better described
as part of the process of nation building advocated by Deloria Jr. or as a move toward self-governance
endorsed and directed by the federal government will be explored later on in this paper. Either way, tribal
achievements in the area of health care have become a key example of the tribes’ ability to take advantage
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57of congressional support and expand upon it through de facto exercise of sovereignty.
The Indian Health Care Improvement Act
Passed by Congress in 1976, one year after the passage of the Self-Determination and Education Act, the In-
dian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA) was grounded in four congressional ﬁndings.245 First, Congress
recognized that the federal provision of health services was “required by the Federal Government’s historical
and unique legal relationship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian people.”246 Second,
Congress set out the two goals of the legislation: to provide suﬃcient services to raise the health status of
Indians “to the highest possible level,” and to encourage maximum participation of Indians in the provision
of these services.247 Third, Congress noted that the federal government had made progress in reducing the
prevalence of disease and death among Indians. Most signiﬁcant, however, Congress found that despite
government provision of services, “the unmet health needs of the American Indian people are severe and the
health status of the Indians is far below that of the general population of the United States.”248 In crafting
the IHCIA, Congress conveyed a clear message that improving Indian health care and increasing Indian voice
in decision-making processes were national priorities.
The IHCIA enumerated 61 health objectives for Indians living on reservations and in urban areas that the
Nation was to meet by the year 2000.249 The objectives included improvements in Indian health care rang-
ing from reducing cirrhosis deaths to no more than 13 per 100,000 to increasing the proportion of children
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58who received sealants. In declaring these objectives, Congress reiterated that the Nation had “special re-
sponsibilities and legal obligations to the American Indian people” and that one of these obligations was to
“assure the highest possible health status” for Indians.250 Congress stated that it was the Nation’s policy
“to provide all resources necessary” to eﬀect these obligations and accordingly appropriated $480 million to
improve medical services.251
Other facets of the IHCIA included the authorization of over $7 million in grants to increase the number
of Indians working as health professionals and to provide those Indians currently working as health profes-
sionals with opportunities for continuing education.252 The IHCIA also provided $300 million for the repair
and construction of health facilities; to the extent possible, American Indian ﬁrms were to complete these
repairs.253 Another important provision of the IHCIA was the establishment of a process whereby Medicare
and Medicaid could reimburse the IHS for the services it provided to Indian peoples who were eligible for
these government programs.254 Arguably, however, the most important provision of the IHCIA was the
establishment of health services for urban Indians.
Urban Indian Health
Many of the Indians located in urban areas had left reservations as part of the government’s relocation
program, but most moved because they saw cities as providing better opportunities for employment, housing,
and education. Urban Indians composed a diverse group of Indians from many diﬀerent tribes and therefore
did not tend to settle in the same neighborhoods. As a result, migration often resulted in a feeling of loss,
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59particularly of cultural, familial, and religious ties. This feeling of loss often contributed to the development
of health problems such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and depression.255
The other loss resulting from migration, a particularly devastating loss considering the struggles with depres-
sion and addiction caused by leaving the reservations, was the loss of federally provided health care. While
the federal government has a trust responsibility to provide health care to federally recognized tribes,256
prior to the passage of the IHCIA the IHS only provided services through its reservation facilities or through
its facilities located close to reservations. Indians who voluntarily left the reservations for the cities therefore
had no access to federal health services even if they continued to be members of their tribe.257 Members of
terminated tribes who relocated to urban areas lost both access and eligibility for services.258
Title V of the IHCIA attempted to remedy this loss of services by establishing primarily outpatient health
services for urban Indians.259 Providing for the IHS to contract with non-proﬁt organizations to deliver
services such as referral and outreach, the IHCIA did not require the IHS to develop urban facilities. Nor did
it require the IHS to provide the same level of services to urban Indians as it provided to American Indians
living on the reservations. Despite the disparity in services provided, the extension of services to urban
Indians was an important step toward carrying out the intent of the Snyder Act, the ﬁrst act to authorize
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60health services to Indians, which had called for the provision of services to “Indians throughout the United
States.”260
Since the passage of the IHCIA, migration from reservations to urban areas has increased. In 1970, 25
percent of the Indian population lived in urban areas. In 2000, 61% of the Indian population was urban.261
Despite the growth in the urban American Indian population, the IHS has made few other eﬀorts, aside from
its compliance with the terms of the IHCIA, to expand access to care for urban Indians. For example, the
IHS restricts eligibility for contract services purchased from private providers to Indians living on or near
reservations in speciﬁed contract health services delivery areas (CHSDA).262 Therefore, Indians who do not
live in CHSDAs – primarily urban Indians – cannot receive reimbursement from the IHS if they see a private
provider.263
Even while restricting eligibility for contract and other services, budget constraints have meant that IHS
funding for urban Indian health has not kept up with the increase in the urban Indian population. In 1979,
the IHS allocated 1.48 percent of its total budget to urban Indian health. By 2001, the budget allocations
for urban health had decreased with the IHS spending 1.15 percent of its total budget, or $29.9 million, on
urban Indian health.264 All of this money went to fund 34 nonproﬁts, which served 130,000 urban Indians
located in 20 states.265
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61Because IHS funding covers only 22% of their operating expenses, these 34 nonproﬁts would not able to serve
nearly as many people as they do without supplemental Medicaid and Medicare funding as well as funding
from state and private sources.266 The nonproﬁts’ ability to bill Medicare and Medicaid is guaranteed by
an IHCIA provision that requires Medicare and Medicaid to reimburse any services that the IHS provides
to eligible Indians, regardless of where they live. Even so, because the federal government does not oﬀer
the same 100% Medicaid reimbursement rates for services provided by urban Indian health programs that
it does for services provided by the IHS on reservations, states are reluctant to establish their own services
for urban Indians.267 The lack of 100% federal reimbursement also renders states reluctant to encourage
American Indians to use those state health programs that already exist. Similarly damaging to the stability of
urban Indian health programs is the fact that most Medicaid programs have shifted from a fee-for-service to a
managed care structure.268 This means that Medicaid will not reimburse service providers like the nonproﬁts
that provide care to urban Indians because they do not function as managed care organizations.269
The rising costs of medical care, combined with the increase in the urban Indian population and stagnant
IHS funding have created a situation such that even with the Medicaid, Medicare, State Children’s Health
Program (S-CHIP) and private dollars, urban health centers require patients to pay a sliding scale fee.270
Budget constraints also force centers to limit the kinds of services they can provide. Therefore, instead of
providing their Indian patients with hospital and specialty services, they can only provide primary care,
referrals, and outreach.271 To receive free emergency service, then, tribe members must travel back to their
reservations. “Returning home in time of need” is a rather common practice for urban Indians. Indeed,
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62IHS Areas272 that contain large reservations often have high user-to-service population ratios; these ratios
reﬂect the signiﬁcant number of excess users, most of whom are urban Indians.273 In addition to placing
restrictions on the services that established urban health care programs provide, the limited budget retards
the development of programs in new areas. It has been estimated that 18 cities not currently being served
by urban Indian health programs have large enough Indian populations to warrant the establishment of such
programs.274 Indeed, the scarcity of urban Indian programs has created a situation whereby 46 percent of
all Indians have no access to IHS facilities.275
There are many reasons, in addition to a lack of resources, that the IHS has not placed greater emphasis on
the development of urban health programs. One reason is the lack of power of urban Indian organizations and
individuals compared to tribal governments.276 The tribal governments are the IHS’ main constituency; they
are the parties with whom the IHS is used to collaborating and negotiating. They are also the parties that
receive the majority of federal government money dedicated to Indian aﬀairs. Moreover, tribal governments,
unlike urban Indian organizations, exercise power on a national or statewide level. They donate to both
federal and state campaigns, and in some states, they are an important voting bloc and economic presence.277
Accordingly, the IHS and the larger federal government are unlikely to want to jeopardize the relationship
they have with these governments by moving funds away from tribes to individual urban Indians.
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63Since the available funding for reservation health needs is already so limited, the tribes also have little
incentive to push for greater allocations for urban Indian health. Tribal governments are only accountable
to those members who vote in elections and voting members tend to live on reservations.278 Without the
power of the tribal governments behind them, it is therefore diﬃcult for urban Indian organizations to get
attention from the IHS.
In addition to the lack of urban Indian power, another reason for the consistent under-funding of urban
Indian health care is the fact that there is very little known about the health status of urban Indians. While
the IHS carries out extensive studies of Indian health on the reservations, it does not conduct nearly as many
studies of the urban Indian population. Of the few studies that look speciﬁcally at urban Indian health,
the majority found that health indices of urban Indians were not very diﬀerent from the health indices of
Indians living on reservations or in rural areas.279
Nevertheless, while overall health outcomes might be similar, there is a clear disparity between uninsured
rural and urban American Indians in terms of their use of health services. Whereas 46 percent of uninsured
American Indians without access to IHS facilities did not visit a provider within the year, only 22 percent
of those with access to IHS facilities failed to see a provider during that time.280 This statistic illustrates
that the lack of urban health care programs for Indians negatively aﬀects the frequency with which they see
providers. Therefore, while some urban Indians return to reservations to receive care, this study demonstrates
that many others go without a regular source of care. However, because there are a limited number of studies,
278Norman Ration, the head of the National Indian Youth Council, cites the lack of representation for urban Indians before
Congress and the IHS as one reason for why funds designated for urban health programs often end up in the hands of tribal
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64and because most of the studies conducted do not show that the lack of access has created serious health
problems for urban Indians, the IHS has so far been able to follow an “ignorance is bliss” strategy with
regard to providing more funding for urban Indian health.
The increasing numbers of Indians relocating to urban areas, coupled with the continued gaps in insurance
coverage281, has recently resulted in some action on the part of the IHS and other organizations to gather
more data on the quality of health care for urban Indians. The IHS has begun funding an urban Indian
epidemiology center282 while other organizations have focused their eﬀorts on ﬁguring out the speciﬁc health
needs of urban Indians. One of the most important recent studies, completed by the Urban Indian Health
Institute, found that American Indians living in the 34 urban areas served by the IHS have signiﬁcantly poorer
health than other urban residents.283 Compared to the general population, these urban Indians experienced
126 percent higher rates for chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, 54 percent higher rates of diabetes, and 38
percent higher rates for accidental deaths.284
While more data will certainly assist the IHS in its eﬀorts to determine how best to use the limited resources
allocated for urban Indian health, it will not change the three key problems preventing the development of
a long-term solution to urban Indian health. These three problems are:
1) the stagnant budget of the IHS, coupled with the rise in the overall Indian population285, and
the rise in the urban Indian population in particular;
281Only half of the American Indian population has private health coverage, compared to 83 percent of the white population.
More than one-third American Indians are completely uninsured. See Id.
282Roubideaux, supra note 276, at 6
283Broken Promises, supra note 2, at 69.
284Id.
652) the general sentiment at the IHS that because urban Indians can access health services if they
really need to, even if they cannot pay for them, the agency should continue to focus on providing
services to reservations, particularly to those reservations located in very rural areas where no other
providers would locate; and
3) the fact that self-governance compacts are only negotiated with tribes and not with tribal or other
Indian groups in the cities.286
Reauthorization of the IHCIA
The IHS, like all other health care providers in the current era of rising health costs,287 is hard-pressed to
determine how to allocate its limited resources to obtain the best health care outcomes. Because the annual
growth in its budget does not even compensate for inﬂation,288 the IHS continually struggles to maintain
services at their current level.289 This is true despite the fact that the government spends twice as much per
capita on federal prisoner beneﬁciaries, and two-thirds as much per capita on Veterans beneﬁciaries, than
it does on American Indians.290 Maintaining the IHS budget at a level that does not even compensate for
287While not within the scope of this paper, the national health care crisis clearly plays a role in the federal government’s
decisions about how to fund the health care needs of American Indians. Rising health care costs and increasing demands on
Medicare and Medicaid not only make it diﬃcult for the government to run IHS direct services, it also hampers the tribes’
ability to take over those services without large increases in funding from the government. In addition, the continual decline in
the number of private sector jobs oﬀering health care beneﬁts means that even if the employment situation of American Indians
improves, they may still be dependent on government health care programs. See Paul Krugman, Ailing Health Care, New York
Times (April 11, 2005) (citing Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that there were at least ﬁve million fewer jobs with health
insurance than in 2001).
288As Mim Dixon, a renowned specialist in Indian health care noted, the IHS “is a health care delivery system so un-
derfunded that it would not be able to stay in business in the private sector.” See Statement by Mim Dixon to Sen-
ate Committee on Indian Aﬀairs, Hearing on Reauthorization of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (July 23, 2003)
http://indian.senate.gov/2003hrgs/072303hrg/dixon.PDF.
289National Indian Health Board, Testimony of Sally Smith, Chairman on the Fiscal Year 2006 Budget for American Indian and
Alaska Natives Programs, 10 at http://scia.senate.gov/2005hrgs/041305hrg/smith.pdf (last visited April 25, 2005). See
also National Indian Health Board, Tribal Perspectives on Self –Determination and Self-Governance in Health Care Management
(1998) at 34 (stating that a combination of inﬂation and population growth have resulted in less health care spending per Indian
person over the past six years).
290NCAI Testimony on the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budge Request for Indian Programs, Senate Committee on
Indian Aﬀairs (February 16, 2005) at http://indian.senate.gov/2005hrgs/021605hrg/hall.pdf.
66inﬂation is also contraindicated by the results of a budget consultation with the tribal leaders which found
that $19.7 billion was needed to bring Indian health status to the level of the general population.291 The
disconnect between what tribes believe they need to fully serve their members and what the government is
willing to commit to Indian health becomes even more apparent when one considers that the FY 2006 IHS
budget is $3.048 billion; this is $16 billion less than what tribes estimate they need.292
Various provisions of the Indian Health Care Improvement Reauthorization Act, proposed in 2001 but not
still not passed, seek to resolve some of the challenges the government faces in making appropriations for
Indian health care.293 Unlike the 1992 amendments, which are the last amendments made to the IHCIA,
the changes proposed by the 2001 Reauthorization Act do not call for speciﬁc health care improvements.294
Instead, the 2001 amendments focus more on improving health care by increasing the enrollment of Indians
in entitlement programs such as Medicaid and Medicare, rather than expanding the work of the IHS.295
For example, the proposed amendments call for increases in funding to hire more eligibility workers to
inform Indians about the beneﬁts and requirements for Medicare and Medicaid. In addition to expanding
enrollment in entitlement programs, the amendments seek to tailor the entitlement programs to ﬁt Indian
health needs and realities.296 One example of this tailoring is the proposal to eliminate deductibles, co-pays
291Testimony of Sally Smith, supra note 289.
292Id.
293Congress held hearings on reauthorization bills introduced in 2001, 2002, and 2003. However, none of these bills were
voted on and there was signiﬁcant opposition to the mandatory funding provisions included in the proposed amendments. In
particular, the Congressional Budget Oﬃce found that three added provisions would cost an estimated $5 billion. The IHCIA
National Steering Committee has encouraged tribes to support the amendments without these three provisions by stating that
even without these provisions, the amendments will achieve numerous improvements. See Broken Promises, supra note 2 at
130-133.
294PL 102-573 1992 Amendments to the IHCIA. Some examples of the improvements called for by the 1992 Amendments
include increased access to facilities in rural areas, development of better water and waste disposal services, hiring of more
personnel, and development of support factors such as housing units for staﬀ. The 1992 Amendments cited some disturbing
statistics to support their call for speciﬁc improvements such as the fact that 90 percent of the surgical operations needed for
otitis media had not been performed. The Amendments stated that without further improvements in these areas, Indian health
was “imperiled.”
295Section 411 of S.556, section 408 of H.R. 2440
296Id.
67and premiums, the existence of which currently deter Indians from enrolling in Medicare or Medicaid because
they can receive Indian health services without paying any out-of-pocket costs.
In addition to tailoring the entitlement programs to meet the needs of the Indian population, the proposed
amendments call for the IHS to help the tribes come to terms with the managed care environment. The
speciﬁc proposal would allow the tribes to use IHS funds to purchase managed care plans or other insurance
coverage.297 Providing further encouragement for the adoption of managed care systems is the provision
granting the Secretary of the DHHS, rather than state or local health entities, the right to determine
whether the programs meet accreditation standards.298 These two proposals are particularly important for
those tribes who are too small to develop their own direct delivery system of care and who might need more
ﬂexibility in ﬁnding appropriate managed care coverage.
Overall, the 2001 amendments provide an interesting contrast to previous amendments. Instead of setting out
speciﬁc health improvements, the amendments look for ways to improve Indian health by doing the utmost
possible with available resources, particularly the resources of entitlement programs. The amendments
similarly depart from the past practice of treating the IHS as the only important player in health care
ﬁnancing by emphasizing the need for tribes to adapt to modern health care ﬁnancing structures. While
expanding access to entitlement programs ensures that elderly and low-income American Indians will have a
more dependable source of care and will not have to deal with the vagaries of IHS funding,299 the strategies
encompassed in the IHCIA amendments do not address the central issue plaguing the government’s provision
297Broken Promises, supra note 2, at 130-133.
298See Testimony of Mim Dixon, supra note 288.
299The goal of moving people from dependency on IHS to dependency on entitlement programs is perhaps questionable; the
government faces a funding crisis in the provision of Medicare and Medicaid just as it does in the provision of IHS programs.
Nevertheless, the very fact that they are entitlement programs makes them inevitably more secure than IHS programs, and the
reality is that there are not very many other options.
68of health care to American Indians. That central issue is, and always has been, a desperate and persistent
lack of money.
The Government’s Funding Strategy: Quit While Ahead?
The government has a trust responsibility to the Indian people to provide them with health care. This
responsibility, originating in two hundred year old treaties and codiﬁed in later statutes, has never been a
government priority. One could not claim, however, that the government has completely, or even mostly,
reneged on its responsibility to provide health care. In fact, most critics would concede that actions of
the IHS have at least contributed to improvements in Indian health care, despite strong obstacles such as
limited funding, bureaucratic requirements, and spiraling health care costs.300 Indeed, since 1973 mortality
rates have declined for tuberculosis, injury and poisoning, infant deaths, accidents, maternal deaths and
inﬂuenza.301
Despite some successes, the government’s eﬀorts to improve Indian health are consistently incomplete and
very often self-serving. In large part this is because the government is neither compelled by law nor by
the amorphous trust responsibility to provide Indians with a speciﬁed level of services. The government
therefore feels it is acceptable to maintain the status quo. Moreover, the fact that there have been signiﬁcant
improvements in Indian health care has added to the government’s satisfaction with the status quo. Indeed,
instead of allocating funds to meet its goal of bringing Indian health status up to the level of the rest of
America, the government is suﬃciently complacent to continue to maintain funding at the same levels.302
300Broken Promises, supra note 2 at 53 (citing interviews with various scholars of Indian health including the executive director
of the NIHB and the director of the American Indian and Alaska Native Research Program at UCLA).
301Id.
302In a hearing on the president’s FY 2006 budget request for the Indian Health Service, the Director of the Indian Health
Service described the proposed budget as “a continued investment in the maintenance and support of the I/T/U Indian public
69It certainly does not have the same impetus to act as it did when there were frequent newspaper and GAO
reports about tuberculosis epidemics or extremely high levels of infant mortality on reservations.303 Indeed,
the government has seemingly succeeded in raising Indian health status to a level suﬃcient for the “Indian
problem” to fade into the background.
The government is similarly unlikely to be embarrassed about the fact that urban Indians have limited access
to health care. One reason why it is unlikely to be embarrassed by the diﬃcult situation of urban Indians is
that the government beneﬁts from the belief shared by most Americans that the only Indians needing services
are desperately poor Indians on reservations, rather than those who struggle to make a living in large cities.
This tired picture of American Indian needs, combined with the lack of data on speciﬁc urban health needs,
makes it unlikely that the government will face much criticism about their failure to provide more urban
health services. As discussed earlier, the relative lack of political activism around the issue, and the relative
weakness of Indian political power likely also play a role in the government’s complacency.304 It is perhaps
also true that publicity around successful gaming enterprises has decreased the public’s understanding of
and sympathy for tribal needs, thus making it less likely that the government will hear from constituents
who want to see more money allocated to Indian health care.305 Contributing to the lack of public empathy
health system.” See Statement of Charles Grim before the Committed on Indian Aﬀairs of the US Senate, Hearing on the
FY 2006 Budget Request for the Indian Health Service (February 16, 2005) at www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t050216a.html. This
statement is far from an endorsement of an aggressive eﬀort to bring Indian health status up to the level of the rest of the
population.
303But see Bernardine Healy, The Shame of a Nation, 137 US News and World Report 11, 54 (October 4, 2004) Healy points
out that the health status of the 2.5 million tribal members is worse than that of any other minority group in the US. Criticizing
the limited budget of the IHS, Healy states that “money isn’t everything, but without it you can’t buy healthcare. And without
it a dent will never be made in the health disparities of these people to whom the government has given its word.” See also Sarah
Kershaw, Crisis of Indian Children Intensiﬁes as Families Fail, New York Times, (April 5, 2004) (citing experts’ statements
that money for health and mental health care on reservations falls far short of demand).
304Id.
305Indian advocates argue that the belief that gaming has signiﬁcantly improved the overall status of Indians is misplaced.
While Native American gaming encompasses 220 tribes and results in more than $16 billion a year in revenue, only half of all
tribes have casinos. In addition, casinos in three states which have only 3 percent of the American Indian population account
for more than 44 percent of all casino revenue. Advocates argue that these facts testify to the continued need for health care
funding from the government. See Broken Promises, supra note 2, at 89.
70for the health care problems of Indians is the fact that 44.7 million nonelderly Americans are currently
uninsured.306
Another hypothesis about the government’s reluctance to expand funding for health care is that it has had
to spend much more money than it anticipated on resolving the Cobell litigation. Cobell v. Norton is the
largest class action lawsuit ever ﬁled against the United States.307 Filed in 1996, the purpose of the suit was
to get an accounting of funds held in trust by the United States government for individual Indians. The funds
came from Indian-owned land that the government had leased to private companies for mining, grazing, oil
and gas exploration. Reports of the Special Master in the case estimated that Indians were receiving 1/10th
the amount of money from companies leasing their lands that their non-Indian neighbors were receiving.308
The trust assets from the land belong to 500,000 individual Indians and are estimated to be worth billions
of dollars.
In assessing the liability of the United States for its poor management of the trust assets, a federal judge held
that the government had taken part in ﬁscal and governmental irresponsibility in its purest form.”309 The
most recent action taken in the case was a ruling in February 2005 requiring the United States to complete
a full accounting of individual trust assets by 2008. Other recent action on the case includes a court-issued
injunction on the government’s sale of any lands at issue in the case without a fair assessment of the value
of the lands and compliance with a thorough disclosure and consent process.310
306Kaiser Family Foundation, The Uninsured and their Access to Health Care, (November 2004) at
http://www.kﬀ.org/uninsured/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getﬁle.cfm&PageID=49531
307http://www.indiantrust.com (explaining the timeline of the lawsuit and posting all relevant court documents).
308Id.
309Id.
310Court in Landmark Indian Trust Suit, Cobell v. Norton, grants restraining order to prevent sale of trust land by Interior
Department www.indiantrust.com/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.
71The government has spent many millions of dollars and many years litigating the case. In the words of
Judge Lamberth, “Elderly class members’ hopes of receiving an accounting in their lifetimes are diminishing
year by year by year as the government ﬁghts – and re-ﬁghts – every legal battle.” 311 He adds, “the
government has not only set the gold standard for mismanagement, it is on the verge of setting the gold
standard for arrogance in litigation strategy and tactics.312 Nevertheless, while acknowledging that the
“Cobell litigation...has shown us the need to examine closely how we manage individual Indian trust land
and individual Indian money accounts,” the government has not taken full responsibility for the accounting
problems.313 Instead of using a separate set of funds to remedy its errors and complete the accounting, it
has treated requests for the funding for the litigation and accounting as just another budgetary request for
Indian programs. Accordingly, “reductions have been made in other areas, which has impacted every bureau
and oﬃce within the Department, indeed perhaps every program.”314
Self-Governance Compacts
Self-governance compacting arose out of tribal disillusionment with the experience they had contracting
with the government under the Indian Self-Determination Act. Under Title I of that Act, tribes could
contract with the government to take over the planning and administration of programs from the IHS.315
Tribes received funding from the government for the programs they contracted to manage and operate.316 In
311Cobell Litigation Team: US District Court Reissues Structural Injunction in Cobell v. Norton Indian Trust Case – Full
Accounting to be Completed by January 26, 2008 at http://news.ﬁndlaw.com/prnewswire/20050224/24feb2005150233.html.
312Id.
313Statement of James Cason and Ross O. Swimmer before the Senate Committee on Indian Af-
fairs on the Fiscal Year 2006 President’s Budget Request for Indian Programs (February 16, 2005) at
http://www.doi.gov/ocl/2005/fy2006budgetforindianprograms021605.htm
314Id.
315Broken Promises, supra note 2, at 54.
316Id.
721987, after complaints from tribal leaders about the way in which the contracts were being carried out and
accusations of waste in the federal Indian bureaucracy, the government agreed to allow twenty tribes to test
a “self-governance” program.317 This self-governance program became Title III of the Self-Determination
Act when Congress amended the act in 1988.318
The tribes rejected the government’s original proposal for the self-governance program because it included
a provision retracting the government’s trust responsibility for any programs assumed by the tribes.319
Had that version of the self-governance program passed, compacting tribes could no longer have relied on
the government to provide ﬁnancial support for their health care programs.320 In response to the tribes’
resistance to this original proposal, the 1988 amendments contained a clause reaﬃrming the government’s
trust responsibility.321 The 1988 amendments also included an important provision allowing the tribes to
recover both the indirect and direct costs of contracting.322 Had this provision not been included, tribes
could have gone through the process of negotiating and contracting only to ﬁnd that there were no funds
left over to provide the actual health services.
Unlike the original Self-Determination Act which required tribes to have the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior before altering programs or shifting resources between programs, the 1988 amendments gave
tribes almost complete independence in determining the content of their programs. Under the compacting
provisions of the self-governance programs, tribes no longer just contract with the government to provide
parts of programs or services. Rather, they enter legally binding and mutually enforceable written agreements
317Tribal Perspectives, supra note 289, at 2.
318“Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments” Public Law 100-472
319Id. at 3
320Id.
321Id.
322Id.
73that allow them to take over the entire operation of a health program.323 Because compacting requires
signiﬁcantly greater expertise, tribes must demonstrate their competence in contracting for three years
before the government will allow them to enter into compacts.324
Support for the self-governance project continued to be strong throughout the 1990s with Congress providing
funds in 1991 for the creation of an oﬃce in the Department of the Interior that would deal only with self-
governance issues.325 In 1992, Congress amended the Act again to increase funding for self-governance
programs to cover planning, negotiations, implementation, and shortfall expenses. That same year, the
governance project was extended to cover an additional ten tribes.326
Self-governance got an additional boost from the election of President Clinton in 1992. Whereas Presidents
Reagan and Bush were respectively hostile and indiﬀerent to Indian aﬀairs327, President Clinton embraced
the idea of tribal sovereignty and the self-governance compacts. In 1994, he issued a memorandum to the
heads of all executive departments and agencies reaﬃrming the government-to-government relationship with
the tribes.328 This memorandum also required executive departments and agencies to work more closely
with tribes and to consult with tribes prior to taking an action that might adversely aﬀect their land or
well-being.329
323Broken Promises, supra note 2, at 54.
324Tribal Perspectives, supra note 289, at 3
325Id. at 4.
326Id.
327President Reagan cut funds for Indian welfare from $3.5 billion to $2.5 billion in the ﬁrst two years of his administration.
Marks, supra note 13, at 352.
328Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Government-to-Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments, April 29, 1994 at http://web.em.doe.gov/public/tribal/whletter.html
329Id.
74In 1994, Clinton also signed the Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act which further amended
the Self-Determination Act.330 Seeking to remedy the problems the Department of Health and Human
Services faced in writing regulations to implement the 1988 amendments expanding tribal control over
health programs, the Contract Reform Act imposed a negotiated rulemaking process on the DHHS.331 The
negotiated rulemaking represented the ﬁrst time in the history that the tribes would play a role in crafting
regulations that aﬀected the way in which they received services. 48 tribal representatives were present for the
negotiated rulemaking.332 The results of the rulemaking were regulations determining how the government
was to award contracts and grants under the Self-Determination Act.333 In 1996, Congress again amended
the Self-Determination Act, this time to allow tribes to convert any contracting agreement to a compacting
agreement.334 In creating these new amendments, Congress emphasized its support for self-governance as
the ultimate goals of the tribes. The ﬁnal amendment to the Act in 2000 made self-governance programs
permanent at IHS.335
The growth in the number of tribes entering into self-governance compacts since 1996 has been phenomenal.
From the original 20 tribes, 61 tribes now have self-governance compacts with IHS. These compacts, in
addition to the 81 funding agreements entered into between the tribes and the IHS, cover 285 tribes and
provide health services to more than 51 percent of tribes.336 The compacts oﬀer an unprecedented degree
of control over programs and services; rather than being supervised and assisted by the IHS like contracting
tribes, the only IHS oversight of compacting tribes is an annul audit.337 One result of limited IHS oversight
330“Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994” , Public Law 103-413 (1994)
331Tribal Perspectives, supra note 289, at 4.
332Id.
333Id.
334Id. at 5
335Broken Promises, supra note 2 at 55
336Tribes who did not choose to compact continue to receive direct services from the Indian Health Service.
337Broken Promises, supra note 2, at 55-56.
75has been that tribal members have had to ﬁgure out how to run programs by themselves; this has consequently
increased employment opportunities and opportunities for participation in tribal government.
Tribal governments report that compacting has been a success. Tribes have been able to determine their
individual needs and apply their funds accordingly, a change from the days when the IHS would apply the
same policies to all tribes regardless of the diﬀerences between them. The ability to tailor funds to speciﬁc
health needs has resulted in a more eﬃcient health delivery system for the compacting tribes. An example of
this eﬃciency is the experience of the Yerington Paiete Tribe. The Tribe transformed an IHS program that
provided care only three days a week without a physician to a tribally run program that provided services
six days a week with a nurse and physician.338
Studies also cite improvements in quality of care as one result of the self-governance compacts. 57 percent
of tribal leaders and 84 percent of tribal health directors participating in a survey on the changes created by
self-governance compacts reported improvement in the quality of care their tribe members were receiving.339
Waiting times, types of services, number of people served, and overall health care system all play a role in
determining quality of care.
Tribes have also proven to be more eﬃcient than the IHS in terms of billing third party sources such as
Medicaid and Medicare.340 Most signiﬁcantly, 100 percent of tribally-operated hospitals were accredited
by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, signaling the tribes overall
338Id at 60.
339Tribal Perspective, supra note 289, at 108.
340Id. at 93.
76competency in running their own programs.341
Surveys have also identiﬁed drawbacks to self-governance compacts. One drawback is the loss of economies
of scale. Because tribes are delivering services to a relatively small number of people, they are unable to
capitalize on same economies of scale the IHS was able to take advantage of, particularly with respect to the
pooling resources on a regional or national scale.342 Removing the IHS from the picture has also negatively
aﬀected eﬃcient data collection; since they began running their own programs, tribes have been less likely
to collect and report data on their members’ health needs.
Another drawback, perhaps not anticipated in the same way as the other drawbacks, is the division between
tribes that has resulted from some tribes choosing to compact and some choosing to remain with the IHS. The
division has arisen because there is not adequate funding to support compacting, in addition to contracting
and full service delivery.343 Tribes who are not involved in compacting have labeled those who have chosen to
compact as engaging in a “money grabbing scheme.”344 Leaders of these tribes also tend to view compacting
as a means for the government to avoid its trust responsibilities.345 Reinforcing this perception is the fact
that compacting tribes have been forced to use tribal resources to compensate for the government’s failure
to cover all compacting costs.346
A Fight Over Contract Support Costs
341Id. at 36.
342Trombino, supra note 178, at 144-145.
343Id. at 145. The greater the number of tribes who choose to compact with the government, the less money the government
puts into the IHS administrative structure. This means that fewer direct services are available for those tribes who remain
connected to the IHS. In turn, the downsizing of the IHS places pressure on tribes to adopt self-governance compacts.
344Tribal Perspectives, supra note 289, at 31
345Trombino, supra note 178, at 145-146.
346Id. at 146.
77The government’s failure to cover contract support costs347 has been a recent focus of litigation. Despite the
fact that the 1988 Amendments established a special “ISD” fund to help tribes with the costs of contracting
for new or expanded contracts348, the fund, providing resources on a “ﬁrst come ﬁrst served” basis, has been
continually under-funded. In 1997, for example, the government allocated only $7.5 million to the ISD fund
despite the tribes’ request for $36 million. This resulted in a funding shortfall of more than $28 million.
The shortfall meant that tribes who were at the bottom of the list either received no funding for support
costs or received funding, but only after they had already made cuts to their programs.349 In March 2004,
the Supreme Court decided to consolidate two cases on the matter of deﬁcient contract support funding. In
the ﬁrst case, Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Thompson, two tribes ﬁled suit against the United States,
the Director of the IHS, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services claiming that the government’s
failure to fund existing and initial contract support costs had forced the tribe to makes cuts in their health
programs.350 In response, the government asserted that the Self-Determination Act, which states that the
“provision of funds...is subject to the availability of appropriations,” speciﬁcally left the funding decisions
to Congress and did not require that all funding needs be met. In further support of its position, the
government cited the terms of the model agreement that all contracts between the government and tribes
must incorporate. The model agreement speciﬁcally provides that funding amounts are “subject only to the
appropriation of funds by the Congress of the United States.”351
347The term “contract support costs” is not deﬁned in the Self-Determination Act. In Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan,
however, the court interpreted the term to mean indirect costs “incurred for a common or joint purpose beneﬁting more than
one contract objective.” This deﬁnition is contrasted with direct program costs which are tied to a speciﬁc program objectives.
See Ramah Navajo Chapter, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1997)
348The IHS allocated contract support costs to existing contracts in accordance with recommendations in appropriation
committee reports; the allocation was not made out of the special fund.
349See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 1054, 1059 (10th Cir. 2002).
350Id.
351311 F.3d at 1057
78The 10th Circuit agreed with the government, ﬁnding that the statutory language was clear, and that unless
the IHS wanted to take funds away from other tribal programs, it had no appropriations left over with
which to pay ongoing contract support costs.352 The 10th Circuit further held that the language of the 1996
and 1997 Appropriations Acts which stated that “$7,500,000 shall remain available until expended...for the
transitional costs of initial or expanded tribal contracts” was also clear; Congress had intended to limit the
amount available for new contracts to $7.5 million. See also Shosone-Bannock Tribes v. Secretary, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 279 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that tribe had no entitlement to
funding for contract support costs beyond the $7.5 million appropriation and that tribe could not claim any
contractual right to funding for contract support costs).
Unlike the Ninth and Tenth Circuits which agreed that the $7.5 million appropriated to the ISD was a
statutory cap, the Federal Circuit found that the $7.5 million was a carryover provision.353 As a carryover
provision, the $7.5 million could be used in the following ﬁscal year for contract support costs. The Federal
Circuit reasoned that had Congress wanted a statutory cap they would have written the appropriations act
to state that the funding was “not to exceed” $7.5 million.354 In formulating its decision, the Federal Circuit
looked to the intent of the Self-Determination Act. Finding that the statute intended tribes to become
independent, and that tribes could logically only achieve independence if provided with suﬃcient funding,
the Court determined that Congress could not have intended that the appropriations act would limit funding
to a circumscribed amount.355 Writing for the majority, Judge Timothy B. Dyk explained: “We cannot agree
352311 F.3d at 1065
353Thompson v. Cherokee Nation, 334 F3d 1075, 1090 (Fed Cir 2003)
354334 F3d 1075, 1094-95 (Fed Cir 2003)
355Various scholars disagree with this assessment of congressional intent. They believe that Congress intended the Self-
Determination Act to end the trusteeship between the government and American Indian tribes and that it therefore makes
perfect sense that Congress would seek to slowly cut Indian tribes oﬀ from government assistance by limiting appropriations.
See Elizabeth Glazer, Appropriating Availability: Reconciling Purpose and Text under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1637, 1655 (2004).
79that the Secretary had discretion to refuse to reprogram to meet his contractual obligations.”356
Fearing a negative decision from the Supreme Court, the National Congress of American Indians has begun
urging Congress to amend the Self-Determination Act to guarantee full funding for contract support costs.357
In the meantime, tribes have to use funds from other programs to cover health care costs. In 2004 alone,
the shortfall for the contract support costs of tribes managing federal programs was $142 million.358
If Congress does not amend the act, and the Supreme Court adopts the Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning
that funding for contract support costs is limited to annual appropriations, tribes will have to ﬁgure out how
to deal with consistent shortfalls in their program management. Given the “ﬁrst come ﬁrst served” nature of
the funding, tribes will certainly have to compete to be the ﬁrst to submit budget requests. The implication of
such competition is that those tribes who receive the funding will likely experience more success in becoming
sovereigns than those tribes who have to move funds from other programs to meet health needs. As the
Federal Circuit noted, this would seemingly defeat the purpose of the Self-Determination Act, an Act that
envisioned all tribes running their own aﬀairs independently of the US government.359 On the other hand,
if Congress amends the act to state that the IHS can divert funding for self-determination contracts from
other areas of the budget to cover shortfalls, it will likely jeopardize the situation of tribes who have chosen
to continue to receive services directly from the IHS.
Clearly the solution lies somewhere in between; funding cannot be diverted from one group of needy tribes
to another, nor can funding be denied to one group of tribes and at the same time guaranteed to another.
356Supreme Court to resolve self-determination dispute (March 23, 2004) at http//www.indianz.com/News/archive/00820.asp
357Id.
358Id.
359334 F3d at 1088
80One possible resolution is the increase of funding for both IHS direct services and contract support costs.
However, because Congress has continually sought to limit increases in IHS funding, this is an unlikely
resolution; incredibly, this is true despite the fact that the federal government has continually exhorted
tribes to adopt self-governance compacting. A more likely resolution, then, is an increase in appropriations
for contract support costs to a level somewhere in between the amount tribes have requested and the amount
Congress has been willing to appropriate. Such a solution will obviously be unsatisfactory to the tribes who
have shown that when given suﬃcient funds, they are more eﬃcient and better at meeting tribal health
needs than the IHS.360
More important than the dissatisfaction of tribes is the fact that any solution that seeks to “split the baby”
will likely fail to address the underlying issues involved in the expansion of tribal sovereignty in the area
of health services. Again, the key underlying issue is cost; the government does not want to write tribes
a blank check for contract support costs. Part of the government’s problem with writing a blank check is
that once it establishes its responsibility for providing full support costs to tribes, there is no limit on what
they will have to pay, regardless of whether they have other funding priorities. Indeed, even though the
government can retract any legislation it might pass, or appropriations it might make, that guarantee its
full support for contract costs, its fear that the creation of such a temporary entitlement will likely result
in greater litigation and/or greater tribal activism prevents it from making those kind of guarantees. As
a result, the government continues to support status quo funding; this not only limits the ability of tribes
to take over their own health care programs, but also detracts from the quality and amount of health care
provided to those tribes receiving direct care from IHS.
360Tribal Perspectives, supra note 289 at 32.
81The government’s fear and consequent under-funding of its trust responsibilities is nothing new. It in fact has
made consistent eﬀorts to confront this fear by trying to limit its trust responsibilities and increase Indian
self-suﬃciency, ﬁrst by termination of tribes in the 1950s and arguably again through self-determination in
the 1970s. Supporting status quo funding, however, is not a particularly rational response to the government’s
concerns about runaway trust responsibilities. A lack of substantial funding will only stymie Indian eﬀorts to
take over health care, and result not in greater self-suﬃciency, as the government would desire, but in a return
of tribes to IHS direct services. A failure to fund direct services fully will result in a similar phenomenon;
the government will face declines in health status and concomitant increased trust responsibilities.
The failure to fund services fully is only irrational if the government believes that increased funding might
eventually extinguish its trust responsibility to provide health care. If the government believes, however,
that no matter how much funding it injects into health care, tribes will still request more, then it makes
sense to keep the budget at a level just high enough that it does not have to deal with activism and just low
enough that it can extend the same funding year after year. The government has followed a similar path in
its attempts to address the problems of inner-cities; it consistently funds community economic development
at a low enough level to prevent riots or serious crime waves, but does not fund it at a high enough level to
make signiﬁcant improvements in the situation of the residents or the cities themselves.
The diﬀerence between city communities and tribes, however, demands that the government use a diﬀerent
approach in dealing with tribes. Tribes are self-governing nations. They have governments whose role it
is to improve the health and welfare of its members. They also have a federal right to occupy a land base
over which states lack proprietary jurisdiction, in addition to (in some cases) criminal and civil jurisdiction.
And while there are divisions within tribes over the direction the tribe should take, and people leave the
reservations for urban areas, they are not transient or politically impoverished communities. Instead, they
82are communities whose roots go back hundreds of years, and whose members view their reservations as
“home” regardless of whether they live there.361
It is not only the history and continuity of the tribes that militate in favor of their ability to exercise
sovereignty in a way that could eventually lead to self-suﬃciency and a lessening of the trust responsibility.
It is also the fact that many have already shown their ability to exercise sovereignty successfully by managing
their resources, lands, and programs in a manner that has increased economic development and tribal
revenues.362 Contrasting this success to the decades of failure experienced by the federal government in its
eﬀort to catalyze tribal economic and social development, Kalt and Cornell note: “In our work, we cannot
ﬁnd a single case of successful economic development and declining dependence where federal decision makers
have exercised de facto control over the key development decisions.”363
An example of the success of tribes in exercising sovereignty through compacting is the following account of
the achievements of the Couer d’Alene Tribe in Northern Idaho:
Before 1990, Members of the Couer d’Alene Tribe had two options for medical care: drive 20 miles east
down a winding road to St. Maries, or drive 34 north of U.S. Highway 95 to Coeur d’Alene. Limited on-site
facilities could not do lab work, and specialists did not visit the reservation. In addition, tribal members
had to go through the Indian Health Service’s oﬃce in Lapwai to get approval for medical treatment. This
meant long distance calls and sometimes as long as two years before paperwork was processed. As a result,
individuals ran up large unpaid medical bills which were often sent to collection agencies. “We decided it was
361An American Indian historian who spoke at the discussion about Charles Wilkinson’s book talked about how even those
American Indians who never lived on their reservations are so connected to the land where their people came from that they
always know where their “home” is. Supra note 286.
362Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development Challenge in Indian Country Today,
22 American Indian Culture and Research Journal 3 (1998), 209. See also Wilkinson, supra note 163. Due to land acquisition
programs, tribes have been able to increase their landholdings by 15% since 1960.
363Id.
83time to address the health needs of the reservation ourselves,” says Tribal Chairman Ernie Stensgar. This
sentiment led Stensgar and other Tribal Leaders to build Benewah Medical Center – touted as one of the most
successful rural health clinics in the country. Completed in June 1990, the clinic serves the Coeur d’Alene
Tribe’s 1,300 members, 700 of whom live on the reservation. The clinic is also open to the general public.
Non-Indians had the same health care programs as us, so we worked together, says Stensgar. “Community
involvement was critical.” Funding to build the clinic came from a variety of sources including the BIA, the
Department of Housing and urban Development and a grant obtained by the city of Plummer. Construction
was made possible by bringing together these disparate funding sources. Multiple sources also account for
the clinic’s operating funds. HIS funding comprises 85% of the clinic’s budget, with other monies coming
from insurance payments, reimbursements from Medicaid and Medicare and private dollar....”We are going
the Self-Governance route because we were doing it anyway. We have a state of the art facility. We don’t
want to jump through all the bureaucratic hoops.” The Tribes is also in the process of compacting its social
services, roads and police.364
The best approach, then, is one that requires the government to fund compacting, contracting, and direct
services at a high enough level to ensure that tribes continue to extend their exercise of sovereignty and to
develop into nations. Instead of seeing the federal trust responsibility as a guarantee, tribes should view
the funding as an opportunity for self-suﬃciency. The government, however, must recognize that it cannot
force self-suﬃciency, as it attempted to do with its termination policy. If the government funds exercises of
sovereignty but the funding does not lead to self-suﬃciency, the government should continue to have a trust
responsibility toward the Indian tribes. If, however, the tribes become self-suﬃcient to the extent that they
can support their own health programs, the government should no longer have to support health care costs,
364See Tribal Success Stories at http://www.tribalselfgov.org/Red%20Book/For%20the%20SG%20Coordinator/tribal success stories.htm
84even if tribes later fall on hard times and are not able to support these costs.
The dismantling of the trust relationship described above would reverse hundreds of years of federal Indian
policy. However, as long as there are suﬃcient safeguards to ensure that the government does not terminate
the trust relationship before the tribes are capable of improving the health status of their members on
their own, dismantling might be the best way to get the government to increase funding for health care
compacting.
Sovereignty and Decentralization: Compatible Strategies or an End to the Trust Relationship?
At the heart of the debate about funding contract support costs is the question of who deﬁnes sovereignty.
Returning to Deloria Jr.’s distinction between nationhood and self-governance, it is unclear whether com-
pacting with the government to manage and provide services is part of the process of nation building or
whether it is a government-endorsed expression of tribal self-governance.
Immediately complicating the inquiry is the fact that the federal government retains plenary power to limit
the scope of sovereignty whenever it determines that the policy does not serve its purposes.365 In fact,
Congress has the power, if allowed to do by the courts, not only to withdraw funding for services but also
to extinguish the legal existence of any federally recognized tribe and its reservation at any time.366 This
is true despite the fact that the federal government has maintained a trust duty toward the tribes since the
late 1800s. The government has also consistently funded services for tribes as well as recognized some degree
365Wilkins, supra note 43, at 23.
366Utter, supra note 4, at 60.
85of tribal sovereignty since that time.
The reality is, however, that the government’s strongest recognitions of sovereignty have taken the form of
executive memorandums or proclamations, rather than the establishment of entitlement programs or other
legislation guaranteeing the government’s support of the tribes. And while the courts have at times come
out strongly for tribal sovereignty and the rights of tribes to determine their own futures, they have not
always ensured that the tribes receive the tools to do so. The situation of tribes is therefore such that
they “must rely not only on the rule of law, but also on the good faith of the federal and state government
to protect their remaining sovereignty rights.”367 Considering the extent of control the federal government
exercises over the rights of tribes to exist, it is therefore diﬃcult to conceive of tribal sovereignty as something
constructed and advanced wholly, or even mostly, by the tribes. Making this conception of sovereignty even
more complicated is the fact that the government has also treated federal Indian policy as an outlet for the
expression of its national political and social goals.
Tied into the question of who deﬁnes sovereignty, then, are the government’s larger political goals, and the
way in which the government attempts to achieve those goals through federal Indian policy. Since the policy
of self-determination for Indian tribes was ﬁrst described during the Nixon era, there has been a continual
move in the direction of decentralization of government services, not only in the sphere of Indian aﬀairs but
in all government aﬀairs. Both Republicans and Democrats have pursued this policy direction; indeed, it
was President Clinton who proclaimed in 1992 that the “era of big government is over.”368
In proclaiming that there would be some changes made to the New Deal structure of top-down social and
economic regulation, President Clinton sought to combat a widespread perception of the government as
367Wilkins, supra note 43, at 23
368Lobel, supra note 103, at 354.
86bloated, ineﬃcient, and controlling. In his proposals for an “ownership society” and private social security
accounts, President Bush articulates a similar, albeit more activist rhetoric. Some of President Bush’s most
recent federal court nominees, for example, are so committed to overhauling New Deal structures that they
have called for the dismantling of federal environmental and wage regulation.369
Eﬀorts to replace those parts of the New Deal structure deemed ineﬃcient or overly centralized have cen-
tered on the contracting out of government services to private parties. Another key component has been
the decentralization of federal responsibilities to state and local governments. Both of these approaches,
described by various scholars as “governance,” seek to utilize “a mix of market incentives, soft law norms,
and ﬂexible institutional arrangements to produce more eﬀective governance systems.”370 Examples of this
phenomenon include welfare reform, the development of school vouchers, and the emphasis on cooperative
or self-regulation rather than command and control regulation.371 The goal of this phenomenon is to make
the federal government leaner and more ﬂexible, and to increase the role of states in administering social
programs.372 The Supreme Court has bolstered these changes by issuing various decisions narrowing the
deﬁnition of the interstate commerce. These decisions have consequently made it more diﬃcult for the federal
government to impose its policies on states without the state’s agreement.373
The views of academics on these developments are mixed. Some scholars have predicted that decentralization
will negatively aﬀect democracy. They believe that decentralization will result in a race between states to
peel back social and minority interest protections in an eﬀort to attract business. In response to the argument
369Jeﬀrey Rosen, The Unregulated Oﬀensive, New York Times Magazine (April 17, 2005)
370See Cunningham, supra note 179, at 135.
371Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, Working Paper Series, 19 at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=165988
372Lobel, supra note 103 at 83.
373Brinkley et al., New Federalist Papers: Essays in Defense of the Constitution (W.W. Norton 1997) 20.
87that decentralization will facilitate people’s access to representatives and their political expression, they claim
that decentralization will merely increase the numbers of bureaucracies and oﬃcials that people have to deal
with.374 Others, however, have lauded the shift to a governance model, believing it to be the only way to
prevent people’s alienation from a government that “spends too much of their money and rides roughshod
over their most cherished cultural, social, and religious values.”375
The expansion of tribal sovereignty, particularly in the area of health care, mirrors the shift from a New Deal
to a governance model. Tracing the changes in the provision of health care from a dictatorial BIA health
service to a less dictatorial but still controlling IHS, and then to self-governance compacting, one can see the
move from command and control regulation to contracting out and decentralization of Indian health services.
The fact that the government initiated this move (although tribal activism and organization certainly played
a large role) might lead one to believe that rather than a step toward nationhood as described by Deloria, Jr.,
the move toward sovereignty is government inﬂuenced and designed. Indeed, tribes have always wanted to
control their own aﬀairs, but only got the opportunity to do so after Nixon’s statement on self-determination.
In response to the assertion that the move toward sovereignty was government directed, one might wonder
why it matters who initiated the move toward sovereignty if it works for both parties. The reason why
it matters is that if the government initiated the expansion of sovereignty to achieve its own goals, the
government will, when forced with the choice, subvert the goals of the tribes to its own goals. Such subversion
would contradict the very nature of nationhood inasmuch as the tribes would still be at the mercy of
government inﬂuence.
374Id. at 19.
375Stephen Calabresi, “The Era of Big Government is Over” Book Review: New Federalist Papers: Essays in Defense of the
Constitution, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1015, 1025 (1998).
88The history of the government’s Indian policy exempliﬁes this kind of subversion to government goals. For
example, the government initiated policies such as termination, relocation, and Christianization claiming
that they would help tribes function better in society and convincing many tribes of the same. In reality,
however, the government promoted these policies, not for the welfare of Indians, but in the hope that the
tribes would become integrated and drop their demands for fulﬁllment of trust obligations. More often than
not, however, these policies had the opposite eﬀect, diluting tribal identity, increasing poverty, and doing
nothing to limit the government’s trust obligations.
One nevertheless might argue that the government’s sovereignty policy represents its recognition that it
failed in its role as overseer of Indian aﬀairs and its endorsement of a sea change in federal Indian policy.
One might argue in addition that the government and tribes do not always have to have opposing positions,
that while they may not have seen eye to eye on termination and Christianization, they both conceive of
sovereignty as oﬀering beneﬁts of self-government and better delivery of services. This argument assumes
that the government is comfortable with not only bankrolling Indian sovereignty initiatives but also allowing
Indians to operate their own programs without government interference.
I would argue, however, that the government’s sovereignty policy, while focused to a certain extent on
meeting the goals of tribes, is also a consequence of the government’s decentralization agenda, an agenda
that does not necessarily contemplate the development of tribal nationhood. Assuming that the government
is supporting sovereignty for the same reasons it is supporting the devolution of power to state governments or
the privatization of government services, the government believes that the tribes can run their own programs
more eﬃciently because they will have a greater understanding of member needs and can better assess
success. This would seem to be the rationale if the government is associating decentralization of services to
tribes with decentralization of services to states. Indeed, considering the fact that the government is paying
89the costs of both the contracting for and the tribal programs themselves, moving the provision of services to
states would seem to be a more apt analogy than privatization to what the government conceives of as the
goals for the expansion of tribal sovereignty.
Nevertheless, privatization or contracting out plays some role here inasmuch as the government’s failure
to cover all costs potentially signals its desire to shift those costs to the tribal providers. Tribal providers
who receive funds from the government will often employ private actors to ﬁll their provider and health
care needs. Thus, the government has successfully taken itself out of the direct service role and moved its
responsibility to privately managed health care organizations or to private physicians and nurses. While
this process is not that diﬀerent from what the government already accomplishes with Medicare or Medicaid
providers, the fact that Indian health care is not an entitlement program gives the government a lot more
leverage to deny or to control funding. Equating the delivery of Indian health services with Medicare and
Medicaid belies the special responsibility the government has for such care and the status of a tribe as a
nation, and not just a service provider.
There are various other reasons why equating the tribes with state or private actors is problematic and why
signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist between expanding sovereignty for tribes and attempting to decentralize through
shifting services to states or to private parties. Unlike states which maintain reserved rights vis-a-vis the
10th Amendment, tribes are dependent upon the courts to validate their sovereignty. While treaty rights do
exist, they have largely been subsumed under the trust doctrine or apply to speciﬁc areas such as ﬁshing or
resource rights. The lack of a constitutional right to tribal existence or to self-governance means that tribes
have no defense, as states do, to the federal government’s eﬀorts to take away or to add responsibilities.376
376William Bradford, “Another such Victory and We are Undone”: A Call to and American Indian Declaration of Indepen-
dence, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 71, 92 (2004)
90For example, whereas courts have the ability to determine the extent of tribal jurisdiction over members
and over reservations – and to change that interpretation at will – states can build policies based on the
knowledge that they will always have the right to assert police power within their state.377 In addition,
states have wide tax bases from which to support expanded services and develop resources while many tribes
have a limited ability to expand revenue through taxation. This means that if tribes receive an “unfunded
mandate” to deliver health services to tribes, they do not have the same ability that states have to override
their budgets or to get the federal government to deliver more resources.
Treating tribes as the equivalent of private contractors or state governments could ultimately jeopardize
the successful expansion of sovereignty by causing an abrogation of the trust responsibility or by fomenting
clashes between states and tribes. The abrogation of the trust responsibility might occur as the federal
government continues to fail to fund contract and/or program costs in an eﬀort to push tribes to make up
for the lack of funds in other ways. And clashes between tribes and states could occur as tribes respond to
the government’s self-suﬃciency message and seek alternative sources of funds such as gaming, which states
perceive as drawing away revenues that they might otherwise access.378
More signiﬁcant, however, is something that cuts to the heart of Deloria Jr.’s diﬀerentiation between self-
government and nationhood; namely that tribes consider themselves separate, independent nations, and
not arms of the federal or state governments. Courts have consistently acknowledged the special status of
377Singer, supra note 40, at 30.
378There is evidence that greater tribal sovereignty has resulted in both greater cooperation and greater conﬂict with states.
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91tribes as sovereign nations. In Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Nation, for example, the court
not only asserted the tribe’s special status as a sovereign nation but compared this status to that of the
states, holding that tribal nations do not share the status of states and in fact “have a status higher than
that of states.”379 In ﬁnding that tribes are nations possessed of all powers minus those that they have been
required to surrender by the US government, the court held that the US Constitution was not binding on
the actions of tribal nations.380 If tribes have a status higher than that of states, the federal government
should not view them as vehicles of decentralization. Instead, tribes should own the sovereignty process by
using it to make mistakes, and in doing so deﬁne and develop their own governing processes; in other words
to ﬁgure out what nationhood, not just government-inﬂuenced sovereignty means to them.
How to develop what Deloria Jr. calls “nationhood” in the context of the paradox of simultaneously demand-
ing greater sovereignty all the while depending on government funds and judicial good-will is the current
challenge facing tribes. It is a challenge recently made more diﬃcult by court decisions that have called into
questions exercises of sovereignty that already been fought for and won by the tribes.381 It is also made
more diﬃcult by the “legacy of institutional dependency” that results in tribes relying on “someone else’s
institutions, someone else’s rules, someone else’s models, to get things done.”382 Nevertheless, it is imper-
ative that tribal governments use compacting to become more than “grants-and-programs funnels attached
to the federal apparatus.”383 In using compacting to improve health services and increase the participation
of tribal members in their own service delivery, they will not only go further in building their nations, they
will ensure that sovereignty is not a policy subject to change in accord with the vagaries of political support
for federalism.
379See Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Nation, 272 F.2d 131, 134-5 (10th Cir.1959).
380Id. In 1968, Congress passed an Indian Civil Rights Act which applied constitutional requirements to tribal governments.
381Cornell & Kalt, supra note 362, at 188. See also Singer, supra note 40, at 3.
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92Conclusion
While federal Indian policy tracks the changes from New Deal to governance, one could argue that Indian
tribes should never have been on the federal policy track at all. Since the government holds both the
purse strings and the key to tribal recognition, however, tribes have not had much choice in the matter.
Tribes should therefore focus on using de facto exercises of sovereignty, ﬁrst to reduce their dependence on
the government, and then to challenge the basis of federal plenary power. When Marshall’s description of
tribes as “domestic dependant nations,” no longer applies, and the government recognizes the vitality and
ability of tribal governments in serving the needs of their population, it will be forced to acknowledge Indian
nationhood in a more powerful way.
At a minimum, a more powerful Congressional recognition of Indian sovereignty would lead to less unwanted
federal and state interference in Indian aﬀairs. Imagining a more radical change, however, it could perhaps
lead to some congressional recognition of the need for a “cooperative plenary power” in which the federal
government, as the supreme power and the original conqueror, will retain its ability to legislate some aspects
of Indian aﬀairs but would be required to negotiate with tribes over others. The aspects of Indian aﬀairs it
would be required to negotiate with tribes over would be those aspects in which Indian independence has
decreased its trust responsibilities to the point that it has lost the justiﬁcation for the exercise of plenary
power.
Cooperative plenary power would ensure that the tribes and the federal government continue to have a
relationship, but that their relationship is more ﬂexible and ﬂuid. By making the federal Indian relationship
more ﬂexible and more responsive to federal-state-tribal collaboration, the tribes and the federal government
93would be utilizing some of the most successful aspects of governance in a way that guarantees respect for
the interests of all three powers. Indeed, governance and decentralization can work successfully with the
development of nationhood so long as every party can both protect and promote its interests.
For “cooperative plenary power” to work, then, the government must not view decentralization and gover-
nance as a way to get rid of its responsibilities; it must acknowledge that while it is the “superior power,”
tribes have a status higher than that of states. Tribes can help themselves to gain the bargaining power
necessary to support their status by showing that they are indispensable in terms of the eﬃciency and
quality of the services they provide to both Indians and state citizens. They have been successful in demon-
strating their indispensability in the political and economic arenas, particularly in states where they have
successful gaming or other development projects; there is no reason why they cannot demonstrate the same
indispensability in the health care arena.
Therefore, a critical step toward the development of “cooperative plenary power” is the continued exercise
of Indian sovereignty in the area of health care compacting. As discussed throughout this paper, full federal
funding is required to make the successful exercise of sovereignty in the area of health care a reality. Without
such funding, the government will continue to have trust responsibilities and sovereignty will continue to be
a government-inﬂuenced process. With full funding, however, both the equalization of health status and the
de recto exercise of sovereignty can become a reality.
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